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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON




State constitutional restrictions on special legislation are common to nearly
every state constitution. Modern interpretations of these provisions appear to
protect individual rights to equal treatment. This article argues that these
interpretations are wrong or, at least, the case law is largely misunderstood.
Rather, an examination of these provisions'history and texts reveals that these
provisions solve important structural problems that arise within state
legislatures and shift a great deal of governmental power from the legislative
chamber to the judiciary and executive branches. This understanding reveals
that most special-legislation doctrine implements a concern for legislative
evasion, rather than a concern for individual nghts. It also reveals a number
of doctrinal reforms that would make future case law more consistent with the
text of these provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly every state constitution in the United States contains a restraint on
the legislature's authority to enact special laws. These provisions restrict the
legislature's ability to identify objects (persons, places or things) in legislation.
In addition, courts have interpreted these provisions to restrict the legislature's
classification authority. The classification restriction has had significant
impacts on state policymaking. It has been used to strike down policy
innovations dealing with questions of national importance like tort reform,'
bank failure,2 and employment discrimination.3 And examples of
unconstitutional special laws can be found across the country on subjects more
important to state politics: a statute requiring collective bargaining for public
employees in Pennsylvania,4 a statute empowering landowners to block
annexation in Indiana,5 a statute providing for the availability of the death
penalty in Colorado,6 and a statute allowing the creation of an inter-island ferry
in Hawaii.
Unfortunately, special-legislation provisions are often misunderstood and
8misapplied. This is due, in part, to the overwhelming attention the academy,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Many thanks to my
colleagues for valuable comments on the paper, as well as to the editors of the Notre Dame Journal of
Legislation for their assistance and patience. Financial support from the College of Law and a
McCollum Research Grant are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (striking down a statutory cap on
compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries in personal injury actions).
2. Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836 (Neb. 1991) (striking down a statute providing payment to
defrauded investors of industrial loan companies).
3. Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, 581 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 2003) (statute
providing county with authority to write anti-discrimination law).
4. Pennsylvania Turnpike Com'n v. Com., 899 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 2006).
5. South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003).
6. People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380 (Colo. 2005).
7. Sierra Club. v. Hawaii Dept. of Transp., 202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009).
8. Attention within the legal academy to special-legislation provisions has been somewhat sparse,
contributing to the confusion surrounding these provisions. Since 1841, only a handful of significant
law-review articles have been principally devoted to these provisions. The most significant law-review
treatments of special legislation include, at least, the following articles: Special Legislation, 25 AM.
JURIST & L. MAG. 317 (1841); La w Reform -Private and Local Legislation, 1 U. L. REv. 340 (1893);
CHARLES BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN STATE
CONSTrUTIONS (1894); Lyman H. Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special andLocalLegislation, 24 KY. L. J.
351 (1935); Frank E. Horack, SpecialLegislation:Another TwilightZone, 12 IND. L.J. 109 (1936); Frank
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law students, and lawyers pay to federal constitutional law. 9 There is no
restriction on special legislation found in the federal constitution. But, given
our familiarity with federal constitutional law, it is somewhat tempting to
reconcile state special-legislation provisions under the nearest federal
constitutional source of classification doctrine, equal-protection jurisprudence.
Taken as such, special-legislation provisions appear to be a source of modem
Lochner-esque rights to equality.10  After all, most successful special-
legislation challenges deal with legislation that would not pose a problem
under federal equal-protection jurisprudence.
State constitutions may, of course, answer questions of individual rights in
ways that are different from the answers found in the federal constitution.11
However, these provisions do not answer individual-rights questions. Rather,
the history and text of these provisions reveals that they were adopted to solve
a set of structurall2 problems related to individualized treatment in the
legislative process.
While some courts and commentators have identified parts of a structural
rationale,1 3 no one that I have found has fully developed it and performed a
critical assessment of the doctrine in light of it. This article provides that
assessment. It uses a fully developed structural rationale to generate a
textually and historically sound understanding of these provisions. This
understanding, in turn, reveals a number of doctrinal reforms and possible
innovations.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part one lays the necessary groundwork,
establishing the need for the reexamination that follows in subsequent parts.
E. Horack & Matthew E. Welsh, SpecialLegislation:Another Twilight Zone-Part 111,12 IND. L.J. 183
(1936); Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-
Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271 (2004); Justin R. Long, State Constitutional
Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719 (2012); Dan Friedman, Applying Federal
Constitutional Theory to the Interpretation of State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in
Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV. 411 (2011).
9. See Sanford Levinson, America's "Other Constitutions": The .Importance of State
Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813, 813 & 822 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition against Special
Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161 (1993); Robert F. Williams, Equality
Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1195 (1984).
11. Indeed, "[a] state constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record their moral values,
their definition of justice, their hopes for the common good. A state constitution defines a way of life."
A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L.
1, 14 (1998).
12. I use the term "structural" to identify process-based concerns and concerns relating to the
distribution of governmental power. The main reason for using the term is to differentiate these
rationales from those that are associated with individual rights. See also Jon Laramore, Indiana
Constitutional Developments, 37 IND. L. REV. 929, 929 (2003) (stating that the term "structural
provisions" refers to all of those parts of the constitution that "describe and regulate the elements of ..
government").
13. Only one recent commentator, a historian, has dug into the history of these provisions and
collected the evidence of structural concerns. Ireland, supra note 8. But he does not translate them into
a structural understanding of these provisions and use that understanding to inform the interpretation
and implementation of these provisions. See also, Friedman, supra note 8 (articulating, briefly, a
structural rationale).
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Part two begins this reexamination by studying the history and the text of these
provisions. It concludes that these provisions have a structural rationale, not
an individual-rights rationale. Part three uses this structural rationale to create
a two-step understanding of special-legislation provisions. The first step
involves the proper interpretation to give the text. The second step involves
the supporting doctrine necessary to implement the text.14 Part four addresses
three sundry aspects of this article's reconstructed special-legislation doctrine.
Doctrinally, my analysis has two impacts. First, it brings a coherent
explanation to some states' classification tests. That is, some states are doing
it right or partially right, even though they have not explained their approach
in structural terms. In other states, however, these provisions are used to
protect individual rights. In those states, I argue that the doctrine should be
narrowed to a textually supported structural inquiry.' 5
A number of broader consequences attend this article's analysis. First, the
coherence it brings to special-legislation doctrine's apparently haphazard
classification tests should provide guidance to legislators and constituents who
often chalk special-legislation cases up to judicial activism. 16 This guidance
should also bring more efficiency to the legislative process. In the current state
of confusion, special-legislation arguments often enter political debate.
Without a clear understanding of what these provisions do, this debate can
waste legislative time and be used to derail judgments that are the legislature's
to make.17 Finally, this article demonstrates how this important area of state
constitutional law compliments the array of federal restraints that apply to
state legislatures and reveals structural problems that attend some federal
14. I use the term "implementing doctrine" in the same sense as Professor Fallon uses the term
"implementation." RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTrruTION 37-42 (2001). In a
nutshell, the term is meant to encompass a broader notion of the judicial role than that conveyed by the
term "interpretation."
15. In the alternative, courts could expand the doctrine beyond the text by using some other
interpretational approach. See Friedman, supra note 8.
16. See, e.g., Barkley Clark, State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislation
andHome Rule, 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 631 (1971). Compare Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc.
663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003) (allowing damages cap), with Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (Ill.
1972)(striking a similar damages cap).
17. In Nebraska, for example, lawmakers were called into a special session in December 2011 to
consider legislation to re-route the TransCanada XL Pipeline. See generally, LB1 (2011, 1st Special
Session), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view-bill.php?DocumentlD=15149. Their
concern was the danger such a pipeline (or, perhaps, that pipeline) would pose to groundwater supplies
in the state. Concerns about special-legislation challenges arose to complicate matters, though the
ultimate legislation was arguably special nonetheless. See § 3(3) (providing an exemption for
TransCanada XL) available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/102/PDF/Slip/LB1-S1.pdf.
The exemption that was arguably special was struck in 2012, when the criteria grandfathering in
TransCanada were no longer sufficient to identify it. The replacement criteria continue to pose the
same problem, perhaps to the same degree. See LB 1161 (2012), available at
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view bill.php?DocumentlD=16138; sections 4 & 6,
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/102/PDF/Slip/LB1161.pdf. I use a rough version of the
TransCanada situation and the resulting legislation as a hypothetical throughout this article.
18. For example, in 2006 Maryland enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, requiring
"employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees to spend at least 80/f their total payrolls on
employees' health insurance costs or pay the amount their spending falls short to the State of
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legislation. 19
I. GROUNDWORK
Three points lay the groundwork for the remainder of the article. Section
A discusses why this article analyzes special-legislation provisions of state
constitutions at an interstate level. The principal reason is their common
heritage and texts. Section B introduces that common heritage and describes
their common texts. Section C demonstrates how current doctrine appears
unmoored from the text it purports to implement and, often, appears
haphazard. This, in turn, establishes the need for further examination, which
I undertake in the next part.
A. Justifying an Interstate Analysis
Examining state constitutional provisions at an interstate level must be
justified before this article can proceed. This is because one of the main
problems that I see in special-legislation provisions is doctrinal disarray.20
However, different state constitutions would be expected to generate different
doctrines. Thus, interstate doctrinal inconsistencies on matters of state
constitutional law are not problematic, unless there is some reason to expect
doctrinal consistency. Moreover, the solution I develop to understanding this
Maryland." Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 457 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007). At the time of
its enactment, it only applied to Wal-mart. The ensuing litigation focused on the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and federal preemption under ERISA. Federal
preemption ultimately eliminated the statute. Id. But short of preemption, the law arguably would not
violate federal constitutional law, including the Equal Protection Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. However, Maryland's law was also subject to a state constitutional restraints on special
legislation. See MD. CONST. art. 3, § 33. If Maryland's effort were within federal constraints, the
restrictions on "special" legislation may have invalidated the law. The plaintiffs in that litigation
claimed that it doomed the law because it singled out Wal-mart. See id. at 185 (noting the challenge).
19. The most well-known example of a special law enacted by Congress that would violate most
special-legislation provisions is the Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). See Adam M Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and
Judicial Resistance in the Schiavo Controversy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 505 (2005) (concluding that
equal-protection likely would not have been successful, especially given the history of private bills in
Congress). See also Steven G. Calabresi, The Terni Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law
Enacted by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 151 (2006).
Earmarks are another example of legislation that would raise problems under special-legislation
provisions. See Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836 (Neb. 1991). Congress also uses special legislation
to provide immigration relief and to allow claims against the government. See, e.g., A Bill for the Relief
of Adrian Rodriguez, H.R. 1107, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (claim against government); A Bill for
the Relief of Aluisa Zace and Ledia, H.R. 731,112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (providing these individuals
with permanent resident status). The use of special laws (i.e. private bills) for immigration is subject to
a vigorous debate. See James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration
Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359,
428-33 (2010). For a larger account of private bills in Congress, see The Constitutionality of Private
Acts of Congress, 49 YALE L.J. 712 (1939); Floyd D. Shimomura, History of Claims against the United
States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625
(1984).
20. This disarray also exists at an intra-state level, which poses no problem to this article's analysis.
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disarray (and rejecting some of the cases within it) is offered to all states with
these sorts of provisions. If these state constitutional provisions differ from
state to state, my offer holds little promise to any particular state.
Special-legislation provisions are not, however, different enough to
account for the doctrinal disarray that I detect. And, given the similarities that
exist among states, this article is helpful to nearly all states with these
provisions. As I explain in more depth below, the constitutional texts are quite
similar and almost all of them were adopted within the same era of
constitutional change. Thirty states have provisions nearly identical to the one
I have selected to reproduce here, many of which were borrowed from one
another or influenced by earlier adoptions.21 The remaining states with these
provisions have texts that are often very similar in relevant respects. Overall,
then, these provisions are similar enough textually and historically to generate
an expectation of consistency, and addressing them at an interstate level is
appropriate.
This article is also concerned with the structural problems that led to the
adoption of these provisions. That aspect of these provisions does not differ
from state to state, either because the state encountered these structural
problems and adopted this solution or because the state borrowed the solution
from states that had encountered these problems.22
Some states, however, may have a peculiar textual or historical basis for
taking a more rights-based approach to these provisions.23 Even then, the
analysis here serves as a basic rationale, to which peculiar rationales can be
added. Such additions may expand the interpretation or doctrine presented
here, but those additions do not displace the underlying basic structural
rationale of these provisions.
B. The History and Text of Special-Legislation Provisions
The primary issue facing constitution-makers in the nineteenth century
was how best to secure a republican form of government in light of emerging
21. For example, Kansas borrowed its constitutional text from Ohio. Clark, supra note 16, at 632.
Constitutional borrowing (and the resulting uniformity) was a function of both the common
constitutional agenda of the era in which these were adopted, as well as constitutional drafters' "belief
in the progress of constitutional knowledge," that led them to look to the most recent constitutional
drafting as the best thinking, often to the exclusion of the federal constitution. G. A. TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 98 (1998).
22. Borrowing can be said to extend to existing constitutional doctrine that the judiciary had
developed in the state from which the provision was adopted, and, more generally, it can be understood
as an adoption of the constitutional thinking of other states. See TARR, supra note 21, at 199-201 &
205-08 (explaining the relevance of other state's constitutions).
23. See ROBERT WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009) (explaining
interpretation of state constitutions). While I think the text of these provisions cannot bear the weight
of an egalitarian-centered individual-rights doctrine, some states have texts that may do so. But see,
Austintown Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Tracy, 667 N.E.2d 1174 (Ohio 1996) (rejecting notion that uniformity
clause of special legislation provision provided courts with authority to review classifications for
arbitrariness and interpreting the text "uniform throughout the state" as requiring only statewide
geographic application).
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concentrations of political power and increased governmental involvement in
economic issues. Their decisions were highly influenced by the political
movements of the time, including Jacksonian democracy and Populism. As a
result, popular rule emerged as a common issue, resulting in broader
distributions of voting rights, enhanced political responsiveness through
elections of most state officeholders, and the recognition that "there was a
good common to society as a whole, which government was obligated to
pursue." 24  Recognizing this common good, "[n]ineteenth-century
constitution-makers believed that powerful minorities, rather than tyrannical
majorities, posed the most serious threat to liberty, and so they included
numerous provisions designed to protect the many against the special
privileges and advantages of the wealthy or well-connected few."
The aversion to special privilege was a consequence of a larger story
reflected in the struggle constitution-makers experienced in defining the
proper role of government in economic development. In the early parts of the
nineteenth century, many states experienced an enthusiasm for state-
sponsored economic development that caused problems. Special charters and
state financing (lending the state's credit, subscriptions of stock, etc.) were
typical in the early 1800s. In 1837, nine states defaulted on their debts, which
triggered a range of constitutional responses restricting such practices. In
many instances, special corporate charter authority was replaced with a
mandate to pass general corporation laws to "secure economic development
without special privilege." 26
Enthusiasm for economic promotion emerged again after the Civil War.
Assistance to private enterprises was, in some instances, kept in check by
earlier constitutional restraints that limited special charters and restricted state
financing. But the promotion of private enterprises persisted. After the
economic collapse of 1873, states again reacted with more restrictions on such
aid. The late 1800s also saw states reacting to corporate (often railroad)
political power.27
All of this contributed to the main thrust of nineteenth century constitution
making: limiting and distributing state power. In the eighteenth century,
legislatures operated with plenary authority, constrained by a few individual
rights provisions found in state constitutions' declarations of rights. The events
of the nineteenth century, however, caused the legislative branch to fall into
disfavor. As Binney noted in 1894, the constitutional changes adopted in this
era reflected a "belief that legislatures are by nature utterly careless of the
public welfare, if not hopelessly corrupt."28
24. TARR, supra note 21, at 100.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 111-12; Robert F Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1195 (1984). For an example of provisions mandating "general" corporation laws and prohibiting
"special law[s]" for creating corporations or amending their charters, see NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
27. TARR, supra note 21, at 115-16.
28. BINNEY, supra note 8, at 9.
452013-14]
Journal of Legislation
The set of constitutional provisions to which Binney refers "impose[d]
increasingly stringent procedural and substantive restrictions on state
legislatures and transfer ed] powers from state legislatures to other officials or
to the people directly." 2  Procedural checks on legislatures that were typical
of this era included requirements mandating that bills be referred to
committees, be read three times, have descriptive titles, have a single subject,
and not be amended so as to change their original purpose.30  Another
procedural check was to limit the frequency and length of legislative sessions,
"giv[ing] legislators less opportunity to do harm."31 Substantive checks limited
the involvement of the state in private enterprise (extensions of credit or
subscriptions of stock) and involved further prohibitions on special
corporation acts.32 The concern for special treatment of powerful interests also
manifested itself through rights provisions prohibiting grants of "special" or
"exclusive" privileges.3
Restrictions on special and local laws were adopted along with these
provisions, reflecting a common concern for the special treatment of powerful
interests.34 After they were adopted by a few states, "the interstate borrowin
of provisions virtually guaranteed [their] appearance in others as well."01
Because of this interstate borrowing, special-legislation provisions do not
differ dramatically from state to state. A common example is Nebraska's:
The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
cases, that is to say:
[1]For granting divorces.
[2] Changing the names of persons or places.
[3]Laying out, opening altering and working roads or highways.
[4]Vacating roads, Town plats, streets, alleys, and public
grounds.
[5]Locating or changing County seats.
[6]Regulating County and Township offices.
[7]Regulating the practice of Courts of Justice.
29. TARR, supra note 21, at 117.
30. Id. at 119.
31. Id. at 120.
32. Id.
33. Williams, supra note 26, at 1206-08.
34. TARR, supra note 21, at 119-20.
35. Id. at 120. For example, Nebraska borrowed its special-legislation provision in 1871 from the
Illinois Constitution of 1870, art. IV, sec. 22, which borrowed its from Indiana and Iowa. Ireland, supra
note 8, at 296.
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[8]Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the
Peace, Police Magistrates and Constables.
[9]Providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases.
[10]Incorporating Cities, Towns and Villages, or changing or
amending the charter of any Town, City, or Village.
[11]Providing for the election of Officers in Townships,
incorporated Towns or Cities.
[12]Summoning or empaneling Grand or Petit Juries.
[13]Providing for the bonding of cities, towns, precincts, school
districts or other municipalities.
[14]Providing for the management of Public Schools.
[15]The opening and conducting of any election, or designating
the place of voting.
[16]The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors, or
others under disability.
[17]The protection of game or fish.
[18]Chartering or licensing ferries, or toll bridgeg, remitting
fines, penalties or forfeitures, creating, increasing and
decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers,
during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.
[19]Changing the law of descent.
[20]Granting to any corporation, association, or individual, the
right to lay down railroad tracks, or amending existing charters
for such purpose.
[21]Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any
special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever;
.... [36]
36. This ellipsis replaces a clause that was added to the Nebraska Constitution by amendment in
1964: "Provided, that notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature shall
have authority to separately define and classify loans and installment sales, to establish maximum rates
within classifications of loans or installment sales which it establishes, and to regulate with respect
thereto." NEB. CONST. art. III sec. 18 (amended 1964).
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In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable,
no special law shall be enacted.37
This provision appears within the legislative article of Nebraska's constitution,
rather than in its bill of rights. The list of enumerated cases restricts the
legislative approach that can be taken with regard to particular subjects,
absolutely prohibiting "local or special laws" in that list of cases. In its final
clause, it states a preference that requires the use of "general" laws over
"special" laws when a general law "can be made applicable."
This sort of provision is found in the legislative articles of approximately
30 other state constitutions.38 The list of enumerated subjects varies from state
to state, but in almost all states, the prohibition is on "special" or "local" laws.
In a number of states, the term "private" is included within the listing.39 In
other states, a process is created for the passage of local or special laws.40
Some states take a slightly different approach. They omit the list of
enumerated subjects. These states restrict special laws by imposing a
requirement that closely matches the final clause of the Nebraska provision
quoted above. That is, these states restrict the use of a special law when a
general law can be made applicable.41
C Special-Legislation Doctrme: A Doctrine Unmoored
Special-legislation doctrine is difficult to reconcile with the constitutional
text and the history sketched above. Even though the text of special-legislation
provisions is strikingly similar in 31 states and similar in relevant part in others,
This amendment came in response to a judicial decision striking down legislation that classified
installment sales differently than other loans. See Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 127
N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1964). This constitutional response is some evidence of the electorate's disagreement
with classification doctrine, at least with regard to that particular subject.
37. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18.
38. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104; ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2 § 19; ARK. art. 5, § 24; COLO. CONST.
art. 5, § 25; DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 11; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 19; IND. CONST.
art. 4, §§ 22-23; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 30; Ky. CONST. §59; LA. CONST. art. 3, § 12; MD. CONST. art. 3,
§ 33; MINN. CONST. art. 12, §§ 1-2; MISS. CONST. art. 4, §§ 87-90; Mo. CONsT. art. 3 §§ 40-42; NEV.
CONST. art. 4, §§ 20-21; N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7; N.M. CONST. art. 4, § 24; N.Y. CONST. art. 3 § 17; N.C.
CONST. art 2, § 24; OKLA. CONST. art. 5 § 46; OR. CONST. art. 4, § 23; PA. CONST. art. 3, § 32; S.C.
CONST. art. 3, § 34; S.D. CONST. art 3, § 23; TEX. CONST. art 3, § 56; VA. CONST. art. 4, § 14; W. VA.
CONST. art. 6, § 39; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 28; WIs. CONST. art. 4, § 31; WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 27.
39. Eg. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104; MIss. CONST. art. 4, § 90; N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7; N.C. CONST.
art 2, § 24; N.Y. CONST. art. 3 § 17; S.D. CONST. art 3, § 23; VA. CONST. art. 4, § 14; WASH. CONST. art.
2, § 28; WIS. CONST. art. 4, § 31. See also UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 26 ("No private or special law shall be
enacted where a general law can be applicable."); MIss. CONST. art. 4, § 89 (providing for a standing
committee on "local and private legislation"); N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 15 (providing a single subject rule
for "private or local" bills); ME. CONST. art. 4, pt. 3, § 13 (providing a direction to provide general laws
for "all matters usually appertaining to special or private legislation").
40. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 10; PA. CONST. art. 3 § 7; OKLA. CONST. art 5, § 32; LA. CONST. art.
3, § 13; GA. CONST. art. 3, § 5.
41. ALASKA CONST art. 2, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. 6 § 26; CAL. CONST.
art. 4, § 16; MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 12; NAT'L. MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 55 (6th
ed. 1968).
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and even though these provisions were all adopted in the same era of
constitutional change, there is little agreement on what the terms "special",
"local" 42, and "general" mean. Obviously, these terms are of utmost
importance to understanding these provisions.43 After all, the restrictions-
outright prohibitions in enumerated cases, general-law preferences, or
both - only apply to special laws.
These terms have, apparently, never been altogether clear.45 Chauncey
Binney was one of the first commentators to try to define them. In 1894, he
synthesized the reported cases and came up with the following definitions:
(I) A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons, places, or things, requiring
legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law.
(II) A special law is one which relates either to particular persons,
places or things, or to persons, places or things which, though not
42. While this article addresses the meaning of the terms "special" and "general", it does not
address many aspects of the term "local." Modem courts have refused to give the term "local" much
independent meaning, often lumping it together with "special." I believe this is a mistake because the
term local may reflect significant concerns with geographic uniformity, legislative interference with
matters of local concern, legislative classifications of local governments, or all three. See, e.g., Schrader
v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 840 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2003) (allowing environmental enabling at
for local governments in one county because of discrete problems there and a state purpose-the
protection of state resources). Delving into all of these will require another article, but a few words can
be offered here.
The third concern-the extent to which state legislatures can classify local governments--
illustrates a large area of overlap between the terms "special" and "local" and explains why many courts
do not use the term "local" in cases involving legislation dealing with local governments. For courts
that keep the terms separate, it explains why they use the same inquiries developed in "special"
legislation cases under the banner of "local" legislation. So while this article limits its coverage to the
term "special", much of what it says about classification doctrine is relevant to those considering what
limits the legislature may have with regard to those kinds of "local" legislation. See Clark, supra note
16 (focusing mainly on the classification doctrine largely at issue in this article).
The other concerns that attend "local" legislation could also shape classification doctrine in
different ways than in the case of other special laws. For instance, restrictions on local legislation may
drive lawmaking to cities under home rule provisions. See id. This phenomenon does not necessarily
occur with special legislation.
Finally, the text could require a much different analysis than that attending special laws. For
instance, some state constitutional provisions on special and local legislation do not include the term
"local" in their general preference clauses. See, e.g., Neb. Const. art. III, § 18. Thus, "local" laws would
only be prohibited on enumerated subjects, with no restriction placed on their use with regard to other
subjects.
43. This subject has received little attention, but it is the key to understanding special-legislation
provisions. Charles Binney was the first to try to restate the definitions in 1894, BINNEY, supra note 8,
at 21-46, and many commentators since have either relied on his definitions or glossed over the text in
favor of addressing the doctrine. Luce, in 1935, adopted Binney's account. ROBERT LUCE,
LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 535-36 (1935); Ireland, in 2004, employed a formal definition, but cited Luce.
Ireland, supra note 8, at 271.
44. See infra Part IV.C, where I discuss what these restrictions entail in more detail.
45. The 1968 Model Constitution, complete with commentary, provides only this: "The distinction
between general and special laws may be far from clear in any given case." NAT'L. MUN. LEAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 56 (6th ed. 1968).
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particularized, are separated, by any method of selection, from the
whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be
applicable.46
These definitions are fine, as far as they go. But they don't go very far.
Everyone agrees that the term "special" refers, at least, to those laws that
identify objects or, as Binney put it, "relate[] . . . to particular persons, places
or things." Everyone also agrees that general laws can employ classifications.
After all, all laws classify in one way or another, as Binney's text indicates.48
The question that Binney was struggling with in his definitions is the extent to
which these provisions place a restriction on legislative classifications.49
All Binney could muster from the cases was an observation that a general
law involves a class that "requir[es] legislation peculiar to itself in the
matter,"50 which in modem language roughly means that the legislation utilizes
or creates a legitimate classification. Binney's account of a special law simply
states the converse point, reporting that a special law involves an illegitimate
classification or, as he puts it, relates to a class "separated, by any method of
selection, from the whole class to which the law ... [might] be applicable."5 1
From there, he reports the various classification tests that he is trying to
generalize.52 Those tests are what made, and continue to make, special-
legislation doctrine confusing. They are difficult to rationalize under a
coherent textual theory, other than somehow getting at the difference between
special and general laws. 53
46. BINNEY, supra note 8, at 25-26.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 25-26. For example, a criminal statute providing penalties for driving under the influence
of alcohol applies throughout the state, but it treats those who fulfill the criteria for criminal liability
differently than those who do not.
Chief Justice Rehnquist made a similar remark about classification review under the Equal Protection
Clause: "The Equal Protection Clause is itself a classic paradox, and makes sense only in the context of
a recently fought Civil War. It creates a requirement of equal treatment to be applied to the process of
legislation-legislation whose very purpose is to draw lines in such a way that different people are
treated differently. The problem presented is one of sorting the legislative distinctions which are
acceptable from those which involve invidiously unequal treatment." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
779 (1977).
49. See BINNEY, supra note 8, at 25-26. One possibility is that they do not impose such a
restriction. That is, it could be that these provisions only prevent the legislature from naming objects
in legislation. But nearly all courts have decided that these terms include some limit on legislative
classifications that is judicially enforceable.
It also cannot be the case that all laws employing classifications are special. If all classifications create
a special law, then all classifications are prohibited in those enumerated subject areas and viewed with
some suspicion in every other area. The problem with this interpretation is that every law creates or
uses a classification. Under this view, the text would amount to an outright prohibition on law in
enumerated cases, and a preference for no law beyond that.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Interestingly enough, and also the source of great confusion, some courts have said these tests
determine whether "'a general law can be made applicable.'" South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683,
693 (Ind. 2003) (quoting IN. CONST. art. IV, § 23). One test arising under that language does resemble
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Courts generally employ two tests. One is geared at "closed classes" and
one is geared at arbitrarily defined classes. The simpler of the two tests, with
the least variation among states that employ it, deals with closed classes. A
closed class is one to which no objects will be added in the future.54 The closed-
class test has been used to strike down legislation that, for example, ties the
classification to historical facts.55 The most common examples involve laws
related to local governments that apply to cities with a population within a
certain range. Such classifications become closed when the legislation limits
the population determination to a particular year or a particular census.56
An interesting example of this test is found in a bank-bailout case entitled
Haman v. Marsh.57  In 1983, three state industrial loan and investment
companies were placed in receivership.58 They and a number of other such
companies had been operating without federal insurance provided by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").59 However, the Nebraska
Depository Institution Guarantee Corporation ("NDIGC") purported to
protect depositors up to $30,000.60 Unfortunately, the NDIGC was insolvent,
offering depositors little protection.61 When the three companies entered
receivership, there were no funds in the NDIGC to pay their claims.62 The
state stepped in with legislation that would pay the claims of depositors when
such companies enter receivership and cause losses.63
Closed status, however, did not emerge from the face of the legislation.
That is, there was no restriction in the legislation that required, for instance,
that depositors suffer losses from companies that were in receivership on a
certain date. 64 The court, however, concluded that the class of depositors
entitled to payment was closed because it was unlikely any other companies
would enter receivership without FDIC insurance as members of the
NDIGC.65
"[Tihe court must consider the actual probability that others will
come under the act's operation. If the prospect is merely theoretical,
and not probable, the act is special legislation. The conditions of
the class-legislation tests addressed here. See infra Part IV.C.
54. See, e.g., Pebble L.P. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064 (Alaska 2009); In re S.B. 95,261 P.2d 350 (Colo.
1961); In re S.B. 9, 56 P. 173 (Colo. 1899); Banks v. Heineman, 837 N.W.2d 70 (Neb. 2013); Teigen v.
State, 749 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 2008).
55. See, e.g., City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (population on a certain date
operated to restrict a parking-tax enabling provision to three cities).
56. See id, see also City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 175 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 1970).
57. 467 N.W.2d 836 (Neb. 1991).
58. Id. at 841.
59. See id. at 841-42.





65. Id. at 849-50.
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entry into the class must not only be possible, but reasonably
probable of attainment." 66
The second test has the most variation among the states. 67 Taken as a
whole, these tests are primarily geared at detecting arbitrarily defined classes.
I refer to these tests as class-legislation tests. State courts first used these tests
to implement "law of the land" and due-process principles, before special-
legislation provisions were adopted.68 They are sometimes referred to as
doctrines that restrain "class legislation" or "partial laws". 69  Generally
speaking, these tests require that legislative classifications involve distinctions
among objects that are relevant to some legitimate public purpose:
But the true principle requires something more than a mere
designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify; for the
characteristics which thus serve as a basis for classification must be
of such a nature as to mark the objects so designated as peculiarly
requiring exclusive legislation. There must be a substantial
distinction, having a reference to the subject-matter of the proposed
legislation between the objects or places embraced in such legislation
and the objects or places excluded. The marks of distinction on which
the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as
will, in some reasonable degree at least, account for or justify the
restriction of the legislation.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court quipped, "Hence a law enacting that in
every city in the state in which there are ten churches there should be three
commissioners of the water department, with certain prescribed duties, would
66. Id. at 849; see also, e.g., Republic Inv. Fund v. Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1990) (striking
down annexation statute identifying a closed class); St. Vincent's Medical Center v. Memorial
Healthcare Grp., 967 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2007) (evaluating a statute that was tailored to the experience of
a particular hospital and affirming a decision that there was no "reasonable possibility" that another
hospital would fulfill the statutory criteria).
67. It also attracts the most attention in the literature. See, e.g., MARRrrZ, supra note 10.
68. See RODNEY LOOMER Morr, DUE PROCESS OF LAw 192-207 (1926) (discussing the
development of this doctrine); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 389-97 (1868); see, e.g., Low v. Reese Printing 59 N.W. 362 (Neb. 1894) (drawing upon
law-of-the-land and due-process cases in striking down an overtime law that exempted agricultural and
domestic laborers as special legislation).
69. See, e.g., Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 272, 332 (1997). Furthermore, sometimes these tests are referred to as "special
legislation" tests. Id. at 332. Notably these tests have been called upon in the debate about what the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution should mean. Id. This
appears to be a result of these test's use within special-legislation doctrine, not their development under
special-legislation provisions specifically. Indeed, early courts had a difficult time hitching classification
doctrine geared at equality to a constitutional text. See id. (describing the development of "class
legislation" in the early 1800s and references to its use in the late 1800s as a reference to "partial or
special legislation" and noting that the doctrine found many different textual hooks).
70. Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800,802 (Minn. 1887) (quoting State v. Hammer, 42 N.J. Law 439).
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present a specimen of such a law."7  Often, a presumption of validity
accompanies such a test, but not always.72 Often, the courts also focus on
under-inclusiveness: "The test of a special law is the appropriateness of its
provisions to the objects that it excludes."73
Class-legislation tests can be more rigorous than the lowest level of review
under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. For example,
in Best v. Taylor Machine Works,74 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
a cap on non-economic damages in personal injury cases was unconstitutional
under its special-legislation provision.75  In keeping with the under-
inclusiveness notions of some class-legislation inquiries, the court rejected the
typical "one step at a time" rationale that often acts as an impediment to
successfully making out an equal-protection challenge 7 and concluded that the
law arbitrarily treated similar tort victims and tortfeasors differently for no
good reason. Thus, the court concluded the legislation was special and, thus,
unconstitutional.n
Other courts have reached different conclusions with regard to similar
legislation, even though they purport to be applying the same constitutional
language and, often, the same test. For example, in Idaho, the court concluded
that a cap on non-economic damages in personal injury cases was not special
legislation, finding that the legislature was "striking [a] balance between a tort
victim's right to recover noneconomic damages and society's interest in
preserving the availability of affordable liability insurance," and adding that
"the legislature 'is engaging in its fundamental and legitimate role of
structuring and accommodating the burdens and benefits of economic life.' 78
The difference between such cases boils down to how closely the court
looks at legislative classifications. 79 Some courts fall closer to equal-protection
71. Id. (quoting State v. Hammer, 42 N.J. Law 439).
72. See SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40:6 n.7 (Norman J. Singer
and J.D. Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed. 2007) (collecting cases); Marritz, supra note 10, at 211-12.
73. Mooney v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 299 A.2d 426 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1973), aff'd, 310 A.2d 502 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
74. 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). Illinois constitutional provision has evolved to omit the list of
enumerated subjects, but it continues to restrict special laws in favor of general law. ILL. CONST. art.
IV, § 13.
75. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1057.
76. See id. at 1088.
77. See id. at 1105; accord Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440
(Wis. 2005) (striking down similar legislation on state equal protection grounds, using a rational-basis
with bite standard); Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996) (using the same standard
for special-legislation analysis); see also Matthew W. Light, Note, Who's the Boss?: Statutory Damage
Caps, Courts, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 315 (criticizing Best and accusing
the court of imposing its own policy judgment).
78. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 4 P.3d 1115, (Idaho 2000) (quoting Patton v. TIC
United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
79. There is another difference that I do not pursue at length in this article. Some courts
implement narrow versions of the police power when they identify the purposes upon which the
classification may be based, which is consistent with nineteenth century views of government's role.
See, e.g., Low v. Reese, 59 N.W. 362 (Neb. 1894) (relying on a liberty of contract and property to strike
down the classification); COOLEY, supra note 68, at 393; HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
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doctrine's rational-basis test. Indeed, some courts simply adopt it as the
appropriate test. Some courts will look closer, giving these tests more "bite,"
by making inquiries into the factual bases for legislative distinctions and
policing instances of under-inclusiveness. Courts that look closer run the risk
of being deemed activist, especially in light of a modem body of constitutional
law that pays most of its attention to federal doctrine. There, of course, the
doctrine as it relates to economic and social matters is dominated by very lax
rational-basis reviews. Of course, one must keep in mind that state provisions
differ from federal provisions in fundamental respects -they "were placed in
different constitutions at different times by different men to enact different
historic concerns into constitutional policy."81
Taken together, closed-class and class-legislation tests are confusing
because it is not clear what constitutional harm they are getting at. From an
individual-rights perspective, perhaps it is some egalitarian principle, in which
case class-legislation approaches would be apt.82 Perhaps it is some notion of
BESIEGED 45-60 (1993).
For example, in Haman v. Marsh, the court also concluded that the class was arbitrary under Nebraska's
version of the class-legislation test articulated above. 467 N.W.2d 836 (Neb. 1991). It appears the court
concluded that there was no relevant difference between depositors suffering losses and anyone else
who would like to get money from the state. Id. The court concluded the state owed no "moral
obligation" to such claimants and that paying them would undermine confidence in the legislature. Id.
at 848. That part of the opinion, however, is more tied to a narrow version of legitimate governmental
purposes than pure classification review. Id. (quoting Weaver v. Koehn, 231 N.W. 703, 704 (1930)
("Clearly it has not yet come to pass that the state, in its supervision of the banking business, has become
an eleemosynary institution")). Weaver was a due process case of the substantive sort. Weaver, 231
N.W. 703. The court reaffirmed this position in Henry v. Rockey, when the legislature attempted to
circumvent Haman by styling its payment to depositors as an appropriation bill. 518 N.W.2d 658 (Neb.
1994).
80. "[T]he applicable standard governing Special Legislation is the same rational basis test that
applies to [equal] protection doctrine." Coal. for Equal Rts. v. Owens, 458 F. Supp.2d 1251, 1263 (D.
Colo. 2006), aff'd, Coal. for Equal Rts. v. Ritter, 517 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2008); Texas Boll Weevil
Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,465 (Tex. 1997); Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d
560, 583 (Tex. 1999); Utilicorp United Inc. v. Iowa Utilities Bd. 570 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1997)
(traditional equal protection analysis); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo.
1992) (using its own unique equal-protection analysis adopted from Justice Stevens' approach in City
of Cleburne).
Interestingly, equal-protection jurisprudence may have adopted these tests from state constitutional
law cases dealing with special legislation. See Saunders, supra note 69. Equal-protection jurisprudence
has, of course, deviated in many ways from this standard in many subtle and not-so-subtle ways.
If equal-protection originated with class-legislation provisions, then what might appear as state-court
lockstepping is somewhat more complex. Here, courts are adopting a test that was adopted from them,
but it underwent significant changes in the interim and, generally, those changes were developed by
courts using the test to implement a different constitutional provision.
81. Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Lawin Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125,
141 (1970). Others have observed how difficult it is to reconcile the use of class legislation tests in
special-legislation doctrine. See, e.g., William Anderson, Special Legislation in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L.
REv. 133, 140 (1922) ("The two categories of class legislation and special legislation are similar in only
one important respect, namely in that they both involve problems of classification. Nevertheless the
two objects have become so confused and entangled in the decisions of the highest court of this state as
to be almost if not quite inextricable.").
82. See Marritz, supra note 10; Michael L Buenger, Friction byDesflr: The Necessary Contest of
State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 571, 616 (2008) ("First, [the
restriction on special and local laws] is intended to prevent an irregular system of laws that lacks
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minoritarianism- "special interests" wielding too much political power. This
would be consistent with significant parts of the constitutional history
described above83 and would explain some class-legislation approaches
adapted to instances in which the judiciar detects a minority interest that has
gotten some benefit from the legislature. But, if either of those is the case,
then the closed-class test appears out of place.85
Closed-class test aside, it is difficult to glean from the text any support for
the notion that these constitutional harms are in play. The text is, of course,
important. Hans Linde has adequately stated the problem with doctrine that
is textually unsupported: "without . . . a conflict with a written constitutional
provision, there is no basis for any general judicial power to invalidate a law if
it is 'bad' enough." 86 To him, the constitutional text is the cornerstone of any
coherent judicial review: "Unless one begins judicial review with this
recognition that it arises out of the constitutional text, one never even reaches
a question of interpretation."87
The text of special-legislation provisions reveals little in terms of a concern
for substantive equality, whether it is the minoritarian concerns of the mid- to
late-1800s or some broader notion of equality. The distinction between special
and general laws hardly reveals such a concern, given its authorization of
special laws in some instances and its absolute prohibition of them in others.
And, given the enumerated cases associated with the absolute prohibition, it
uniformity or grants special legal preferences to particular classes or individuals. Second, it is closely
connected to the concept that all residents of a state should enjoy equal protection of law.").
83. See TARR, supra note 21; Williams, supra note 26, at 1206-10; see also GILLMAN, supra note
79 (discussing these provisions in the context of judicial philosophies of the time).
84. See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) ("This court has consistently
held that the purpose of the special legislation clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications
that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis."); John Martinez, Getting
Back the Public's Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in American Property Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 619,
659 (2010).
85. Previously, I have attempted to rationalize the closed-class test under an equal-rationale, using
a theory of temporal equality-that is, the notion that future similarly situated objects should be treated
the same as those in existence and included within such a class. Assuming that to be the case, a concern
for equality may animate it. If that is not the case, then there is no support to be found in equality
rationales for such a rule. See MIEWALD, LONGO & SCHUTZ, THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 161-62 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining the closed-class rule as rule derived from the
class-legislation test used in Nebraska, but failing to link either test to the text of Nebraska's provision).
Some courts have equated closed classifications with arbitrary classifications as well. See, e.g., City of
Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 154 (Fla. 2002) ("this Court utilizes a reasonable relationship test
for analyzing special laws, but . .. a population classification tied to a specific date will fail this test if it
constitutes an arbitrary classification"). This idea would find an analogue in the deontological
justification for the rule of precedent, which involves considerations of temporal equality and
consistency. See Benjamin Friedman, Fishkin and Precedent: Liberal Political Theory and the
Normative Uses of History, 42 EMORY L. J. 647, 704-05 (1993).
86. Linde, supra note 81, at 130.
87. Linde, supra note 81, at 131; see also, TARR, supra note 21, at 194-96 (discussing how state
constitutional interpretation is often premised upon a textual approach). Interestingly, Linde's
approach to textualism preceded similar approaches to federal constitutional interpretation. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy
Gutmann et. al. eds., 1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990).
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does not appear that these are areas in which concerns for inequality would
have been paramount. Subjects like divorce, name changes, public-school
management, and changes of venue do not reveal a concern for equality or a
finer-grained concern for minoritarianism.
Moreover, the only textual evidence of minoritarian concern begs for an
answer to the question of whether a law is general or special. The provision
set forth above, like many others, prohibits at least three instances of legislative
favoritism in its 18th, 20th, and 21st clauses. The one most clearly related to
minoritarian concern prohibits "granting to any corporation, association, or
individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise
whatever." But it does not absolutely prohibit granting such privileges.
Rather, it prohibits such a grant through a special law. A general law creating
such a benefit would be acceptable. Thus, the meaning of special and general
laws must relate to something other than bestowing special benefits on a
minority interest. What that may be, however, remains somewhat of a
mystery.89
In sum, special-legislation doctrine involves tests that are difficult to
reconcile with one another and the constitutional text. An egalitarian or
minoritarian rationale does not appear textually supported. Even if such
rationales are historically grounded to some extent, some parts of the doctrine
appear geared at such concerns, while others do not. And it is difficult to
discern what, if anything, laws failing these tests have in common with laws that
identify objects (which all agree are special laws). Thus, these provisions at
least deserve further examination as a theoretical matter.
More practically, further examination is necessary because of the problems
these provisions present to legislators, citizens and courts. Legislators who
care about the parameters of their institution's authority find little assistance
in the cases. Other legislators, and the lobbyist trying to persuade them, use
the prospect of litigation as a tool to cloud political debate. Citizens are left
wondering what legislation they can request and what legislation they should
challenge. And courts are put in the position of acquiring activist status. 0
Even if the judiciary's reputation remains intact when it strikes down
legislation, the existence of unconstitutional legislation damages the
legislature's reputation and causes skepticism about the legislative process.91
88. For a case evaluating similar language, after first finding the law was special, see Lawnwood
Medical Center, v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2008), which collected cases on the definition of privilege
clauses found in enumerated subjects.
89. Cases hitching these tests to the general-preference clause confuse matters as well because
they leave the term "special" undefined. See South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 693 (Ind. 2003).
Textually, there is no reason to test a law under this language unless it is special. Indeed, such cases
tend to use arbitrariness inquiries to identify special laws.
90. See Clark, supra note 16, at 651-53 (criticizing a series of cases in which public policy seemed
to be the driving force behind the special-legislation conclusion). For elected judges, which are common
in state judicial systems, perceptions of activism can drive outcomes in ways that are more significant
than in the federal system.
91. Normally an article of this sort would present a summary of the large body of scholarship
devoted to the subject, placing this piece within the larger literature. However, most treatments of this
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1I. UNCOVERING A STRUCTURAL RATIONALE
A structural rationale explains these provisions, their text, and the proper
role of the implementing doctrine. I build this structural rationale from two
sources. In section A, the article expands on the history of constitution making
associated with these provisions and explains what special-legislation
provisions were designed to do-restrict legislatures from making laws for
individual constituents. In section B, the article illustrates this understanding
by considering how the restriction plays out in a hypothetical case of an
archetypical special law.
A. Individualized Treatmentin Legislative Bodies
As explained above, restrictions on special and local laws were adopted in
an era when the constitutional agenda was dominated by concerns for the
special treatment of powerful interests. But a concern for powerful interests
does not precisely capture the nature of the problem. Rather, the special-
legislation problem had more to do with the legislature's ability to identify
objects in legislation than with legislative favoritism. Indeed, legislative
favoritism is more properly characterized as one consequence of the
legislature's power to provide individuals with legislation.
Contemporary statements of the problem are consistent with this
understanding. Governor Morton of Massachusetts addressed the problem of
special laws in his inaugural address in 1839. According to an 1841 author, his
description "may probably be considered as an authentic exposition of what is
supposed to be meant by 'special legislation."' 92
A recurrence to our legislative history will show how small a
proportion of our labor is given to the public, and how much to
individuals. Of the nine hundred acts which were passed in the last
four years, seven hundred fall under the denomination of 'special
laws,' while not over two hundred were general laws. And, as might
naturally be expected, a still greater proportion of the resolves are of
a private nature. There are undoubtedly cases involving private
interests, which deserve and should receive the attention and the
action of the legislature. But surely it should not be our principal
employment to enact 'special statutes.' It also appears, that some of
subject are descriptive or critical only in the sense that they argue that the classification tests have
become too lax or are being employed inconsistently by a state supreme court. See, e.g., Anderson,
supra note 81; Clark, supra note 16; Marritz, supra note 10. Others operate at a broad level across
constitutional provisions within a constitution, briefly citing these provisions as part of a larger inquiry.
See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 79, at 58-60; Williams, supra note 26. My purpose, however, is to explore
the text of these provisions and their history to understand the doctrine and identify instances in which
it goes wrong or gets things right. There simply isn't a large canon of scholarship devoted to that subject
to report here. That which is relevant is cited throughout the article.
92. Charles C. Little & James Brown, Special Legislation, 25 AM. JURIST & LAW MAG. 317, 318
(1841) (quoting the inaugural address of Governor Morton) (internal quotations omitted).
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the private acts are passed for the purpose of exempting particular
cases from the operation of general laws. I need not suggest, that such
legislation is fraught with danger. This body is not favorably
constituted for the investigation of private claims, and is liable to be
misled by the representations and importunities of individuals
complaining of the unjust and severe application of general rules. In
a government of laws, the laws themselves should be general and just,
and should be allowed to have a free and equable course,
uninterrupted by the interference of any department of
government. 93
While Governor Morton's exposition refers to broad notions of equality in
the last sentence, the rest of this quote reveals concerns attending
individualized legislation. The strongest evidence of this concern is the count
he offers. He, and many others, counted the number of special laws as a means
of justifying prohibitions on the practice. 94 Such counts are only possible with
laws that identify objects. Governor Morton also characterizes this count as
evidence of disproportionate labor devoted to individuals and their "particular
cases."
The terminology that special-legislation provisions use was also not new
when it was adopted. The terms "special" and "general" were used in earlier
restrictions related to corporate charters. There, the text clearly refers to
individualized treatment, mandating general corporation laws rather than
allowing legislatures to make an individualized determination of whether a
particular corporate charter should issue or be amended.95
Robert Ireland, a historian, has thoroughly studied the problem of special
legislation.96 His study reveals that the main concern was with legislation that
named its objects. The examples and contemporary statements of the problem
that he collects reveal that the primary focus of these provisions was on laws
that identified an object and singled it out for special treatment.9
93. Id. at 318-19.
94. LucE, supra note 43, at 544-46 (collecting counts); Ireland, supra note 8.
95. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("The Legislature shall provide by general law for the
organization, regulation, supervision and general control of all corporations.. . . No corporations shall
be created by special law .... ").
96. See Ireland, supra note 8.
97. See Ireland, supra note 8. Modern examples of special laws that name objects can also be
found in states that allow special laws, conditioned upon compliance with a process for their enactment.
For example, Florida allows special laws, but only if notice of them is published. See FLA. CONST. art.
III, § 10 ("No special law shall be passed unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been
published in the manner provided by general law."); see alsoMO. CONST. art. 3, § 42. Florida also has
an outright prohibition on special laws dealing with enumerated subjects. Id. § 11.
Connecticut allows special laws except in a few instances. See CONN. CONST. art. X. Interestingly, it
also includes a provision effectively making special legislation an individualized inquiry: the legislature,
"shall enact no special legislation relative to the powers, organization, terms of elective offices or form
of government of any single town, city or borough, except...." CoNN. CONST. art. X, § 1 I have yet
to find an example of legislation involving a classification that has been designated as a special law by
a modern legislature.
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There were at least four problems associated with such legislation that one
gleans from the historical sources. The first and most significant was a lack of
legislative scrutiny, which arose from the representative composition of the
legislature. As Governor Morton put it, the legislature is "not favorably
constituted"98 for some matters. Decisions for things like individual charters,
divorces, or name changes were not likely to garner sufficient attention. When
a representative came to the floor with a bill that applied to one company or
person within his or her constituency, there was little reason for the general
public to take note. As a result, other legislators were unlikely to ex ose the
matter to rigorous debate, let alone investigate the merits of the bill.9F
If the other legislators were inclined to pay attention, their attention was
not driven by constituency impact. Rather, it was tied to the prospect of getting
the proposing legislator's vote on their measures. However, even that sort of
attention became hard to count on. In many instances, an understanding
developed among legislators that the proposing legislator's peers would not
resist the proposed legislation, so long as the proposing legislator would not
resist similar bills from his or her peers. This "legislative courtesy" or
"logrolling" was common in the nineteenth century and was one of the primary
reasons why constitutional drafters decided that special lawmaking was
problematic.100
Second, such legislation involves things that can reflect poorly on the
administration of justice. Ex parte communications and perceived conflicts of
interest (if not all-out bribery'ol) attended lawmaking that involved individual
constituents. Given the volume of bills, the lack of public impact, and
legislation that often provided beneficial treatment to such individuals, a sense
of distrust developed within the electorate.102
Third, individualized lawmaking took time; time that was better spent on
law that applied to broader problems.103 Taking up individual cases for each
representative robbed the legislature of the time it needed to deal with
problems of a more public nature.
Fourth, bottling up legislative judgments in terms that name but one object
98. Little & Brown, supra note 92, at 318 (quoting the inaugural address of Governor Morton).
99. See Ireland, supra note 8, at 286 (no time for investigation); accord HENRY HITCHCOCK,
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A STUDY OF THEIR GROwTH 39-40 (1887).
Constitutional provisions that include a public-notice process for enacting special laws are clear
evidence of this problem. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10; Mo. CONST.
art. 3, § 42. In these states, the approach has been to overcome the tendencies of such representative
lawmaking by erecting a process that exposes them to more public attention and, thus, legislative
scrutiny. See Howard P. Walthall, Sr., A Doubtful Mind: Understanding Alabama's State Constitution,
35 CUMB. L. REv. 7, 58-59 (2004). Such an approach is open to the criticism that the public is ill-suited
to police such legislation, for the same reasons that legislators are unlikely to look twice: the bulk of it
doesn't affect a sufficient number of constituents.
100. Ireland, supra note 8, at 273; Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in
State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 642-57 (1994); South Bend v. Kimsey, 781
N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003).
101. Ireland, supra note 8, at 277-78.
102. See id.
103. See id.; LUCE, supra note 43, at 540-44.
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104withheld similar treatment to similar objects. The next bill that came before
the legislature on the same subject with the same facts had no assurance of
similar treatment.
A limitation on special laws can be construed as a means of dealing with
these problems, 105 all of which are structural and arise most clearly with laws
that identify objects. There is, however, further evidence of a structural
orientation that can be gleaned from special-legislation provisions' placement
within state constitutions, contemporaneous constitutional changes, and the
overall goals of nineteenth century reformers.
The placement of these provisions within state constitutions is consistent
with a structural rationale. Special-legislation provisions are not contained
within bill-of-rights articles of state constitutions. Rather, they are found in
the legislative articles. And their text often specifically limits their applicability
to "the legislature." This indicates a concern with the legislative body and
suggests similar concerns do not arise with other branches of state government.
Special-legislation provisions were also included in state constitutions
along with a slate of other procedural checks on legislatures, like single-subject
rules, requirements concerning the title of bills, requirements for multiple
readings, and so on.106 Those checks clearly reflect a concern for legitimate
and transparent lawmaking and were adopted to facilitate the public's
oversight of legislation and legislators. When considered in the context of
these provisions, special-legislation provisions could be a realization that these
procedural checks were insufficient to guard against other forms of legislation
that can raise transparency and accountability problems, like laws that apply
to individual objects.
Finally, the overall goals of many nineteenth century reforms are
consistent with a structural rationale for these provisions. Distributing
governmental power away from legislatures to other branches was a common
feature of nineteenth century constitutional reforms. Along with that
redistribution came reforms making the judiciary, the chief executive, and
many other executive actors democratically accountable. Special-legislation
104. Ireland, supra note 8, at 279. Professor Ireland devotes only a part of a paragraph to the
question of equality in his study of the era in which these provisions were adopted. He describes a few
critics claiming special legislation amounted to the denial of equal protection, violating the "salutary
maxim of 'equal rights special privileges to none,"' and describes a gubernatorial veto based upon the
principle. Id. This is further evidence that these provisions were not designed to impose a broad notion
of equality. Rather, it means they were designed to prohibit a practice that offended the principle of
equality. The text, thus, has a narrower focus, but the restriction it places on legislatures serves
egalitarian ends.
105. There are other ways of dealing with these problems. An interestingly similar set of problems
arose with regard to claims against the U.S. government. Shimomura provides a thorough explanation
of how that system evolved. Shimomura, supra note 19. There, the progression began with legislative
adjudication, evolved to a hybrid model where both the courts and the legislature were involved, and
culminated in a judicial model. As with the states' experience with special legislation, the administrative
burden on the legislature and the appearance of impropriety in claim acceptance or rejection were
reasons for moving from the legislative model in the 1830s and 1840s. Id. at 648-50.
106. ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION, 151-58 (1917) (discussing changes
in state constitutions).
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provisions can be understood as limiting legislative authority to deal with
individualized cases and shifting that power to these other branches of
government. Taken in that light, these provisions have separation-of-powers
implications. In fact, individualized legislation passed before the adoption of
special-legislation provisions raised significant separation-of-powers
concerns. These provisions can be seen as dealing with those concerns.
B. Illustrating the Structural Rationale
Considering an example of how a special-legislation provision affects a law
that names its object reveals how these provisions impact a legislature and
define its role within the state constitutional structure. Imagine that I go to my
friendly legislator asking him to introduce a bill dissolving my marriage. os In
making my plea (over drinks and ex parte) I explain my circumstances: the
marriage is broken, the children are grown, and the assets are clearly and
amicably divided. In my opinion, there is little reason for our legal relationship
to persist.
Assume that my legislator agrees and introduces a bill for my relief. Once
introduced, my bill passes along with hundreds of others dealing with similar
individual matters. It is unlikely that any of these bills will receive much
legislative scrutiny. Indeed, given legislative courtesy, my bill and others like
it are virtually guaranteed passage with no debate. There is also little reason
for the public- the most important check on legislative abuse - to take notice,
call their legislators, or exercise their votes as objections to their legislators'
assent. After all, the matter has almost no impact on them. Similarly, such
lawmaking is unlikely to garner media attention because it is unlikely to raise
the public's interest. In essence, "this body is not favorably constituted for the
investigation of [my] private claims,"109 because, given its structure and the
impact of this legislation, the legislature likely will not scrutinize the matter at
all.
107. See, e.g., Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13 (1862) (sale of minor's real estate, collecting cases, and
expressing "the general impoficyof acts of like character"); State v. Fry and Others, 4 Mo. 120,134-35
(1835); Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 572 (1829) (expressing doubt that the legislature could authorize
the sale of land of a particular minor); see also, Ronald L. Nelson, Social Instrumentalism in the
Jacksonian Decade: State High Court Decisions Regarding Marriage and Religion, 1928-1837,48 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 7-8 (2006); Ireland, supra note 8.
108. Ireland, supra note 8, at 289-90. Divorce is the most common enumerated subject upon which
no special law can be passed. To the modem eye, my example might appear contrived. But when these
provisions (or precursors dealing only with divorce) were adopted, the practice was somewhat common.
See id. (describing the practice and reporting that "Kentucky lawmakers divorced 138 couples by
special legislation at their 1848-49 session."); see also Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 353 (1959)
(evaluating a constitutional challenge to a Texas domiciliary statute granting military personnel the
power to petition for divorces, concluding the special-legislation prohibition was geared only at granting
divorces to individuals with legislation, and noting the historical practice of legislative divorces); Teft v.
Teft, 3 Mich. 67 (1853) (holding a statute granting a named individual a divorce upon proof of insanity
of the other spouse was constitutionally prohibited, and noting other states' special law's provisions on
the subject). Any example of a low-impact law would, however, illustrate the point.
109. SpecialLegislation, 25 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 317,318-19 (1841); see also Walthall, supra note
99, at 59 (stating that local legislation is prone to the same difficulty).
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If the custom of running this legislation through without scrutiny emerges,
it robs the legislature of time it could spend on other matters. And even if
legislators wanted to spend time scrutinizing the matter, they would not have
the time to do so given the volume of requests. This would mean that either
many bills pass with no scrutiny, or many bills do not get taken up while others
do. 110
Each legislator is also effectively vested with the authority to grant the
desired relief. This would be a problem, for example, if my legislator denied
my request. I would have no recourse. And for any who come after me with
the same request, there is no formal precedent to be found in the legislator's
prior actions. The lawmaking function thus flies under the public's radar and
it becomes sporadic, unreasoned, perhaps trivial, and available only to some
on unknown terms.
The prohibition on special legislation, however, changes matters
remarkably. It requires the legislator to take my circumstances to the
legislative body. The legislator will then present them in the form of a law that
erects a standard or set of criteria that, if met, enunciates circumstances under
which anyone can get a divorce. This, in turn, extends my treatment to others
similarly situated. Expanding the scope of the law is more likely to engender
legislative scrutiny because it will draw the public's attention and, thus, that of
other legislators. The legislature has also been transformed from a place for
seeking redress to a standard-setting or rule-making body. The law, of course,
still classifies. Those meeting the criteria are treated differently from those
that do not. But creating that classification was one point of restricting the
legislative power to deal only with my case.
There is also no individualized fact-finding problem when the law is framed
in general terms. There is no need for the legislature to investigate the facts of
my case, though it may need to investigate the factual predicate for affording
people like me a divorce. For instance, it may need to examine the impact of
divorce on children, the difficulty associated with dividing assets, and so on, as
it determines how to create a standard and process for divorces. But
legislatures are up to the task of this sort of legislative factfinding.11 In fact,
110. There are some who argue that the time concern, as well as others, was overstated. See, e.g.,
Special Legislation for Municipaities, 18 HARV. L. REV. 588, 602 (1905).
111. The difference is between legislative factfinding, which legislatures are suited to do, and
adjudicative factfinding, which they are not. Kenneth Culp Davis cryptically stated the nature of
legislative factfinding:
Because they are the direct representatives of the people, the law imposes no
restrictions on them with respect to their use or nonuse of facts as a basis for
legislating. Legislators are unrestricted in receiving information or misinformation
from any source by any means; they may suppress or disclose it as they choose. They
may legislate, if they choose, with a bull-in-a-china-shop ignorance, without facts,
without reasons, and with minds closed to reasoned argument, as long as what they
enact is sufficiently reasonable to meet due process requirements.
Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931-32 (1980). However, because
they are representatives of the people, special-legislation provisions recognize that legislative attention
to individual cases raises process problems.
62 [ Vol. 40: 1
State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation
by requiring the legislature to speak in rules and standards, special-legislation
provisions put legislatures in the position of having to make these inquiries.
When a legislator brings standards or sets of criteria to the legislative body for
approval, reasonable disagreement among legislators is likely to facilitate a
more arduous process within which factual predicates will be explored and
debated.
Once the legislature is placed in its policymaking role, a need emerges for
an apparatus to administer such a law. Indeed, with a subject like divorce, it
would be absurd to simply extend my divorce to all others similarly situated.
Rather, the ensuing law will likely include a standard under which willing
petitioners can seek to have their marriage dissolved based upon certain
showings. The result, for our purposes, is that other branches of government
will be enlisted to deal with individual cases. The judiciary is, of course, the
obvious place to look in this particular case. It will be charged with making the
factual judgments necessary to the legislation's application and enter an order
backed by the state. And it will do all of this in a way that is unclouded by the
kinship petitioners may have with their legislators. Thus, the legislature can be
seen as fulfilling a policymaking role that creates laws that are administered
and enforced by other institutional actors more suited to operate in individual
cases.
This hypothetical also reveals one more crucial aspect of special-legislation
provisions: Legislatures probably were not enacting all special laws simply to
confer invidious benefits on powerful interests. That is, those who would come
before the legislature in pursuit of individualized treatment were doing so for
good reasons as well as bad ones. In some instances that reason may have been
greed, backed by power. But in other instances, the request would simply be
a legitimate, well-grounded request for legal relief. Providing that relief was
one of many tasks legislators were faced with, and it was likely to garner the
legislator political favor among his or her constituents.
From this, one can conclude that special lawmaking is not inherently
vicious. But the dangers that accompany legislatures adjudicating individual
cases, and the lack of any institutional capacity to do so, make them an
inappropriate place in most cases112 to provide individualized relief.
Consequently, constitution drafters decided to restrict the legislative response
to constituents by requiring it to speak in rules or standards and utilize other
branches of government that were more suited to the task.
By requiring legislatures to respond in this manner, the scope of what
constituents can ask the legislature for is also limited-their arguments must
resonate on the merits because the legislature must use the merits in setting a
standard or establishing criteria for whatever legal treatment it deems
appropriate. Those standards or criteria will, in turn, provide the individual
and others similarly situated the relief that the legislature concludes they
deserve.
112. Special lawmaking is, after all, allowed outside of enumerated cases, when a general law cannot
be made applicable. See supra, text accompanying note 37 & infra Part IV.C.
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This hypothetical shows that the main problem underlying special
legislation was structural. A representative body making law for an individual
poses significant dangers of process failure. That failure and the resulting
legislation can damage the reputation of the legislature. When restricted from
providing legislation to individuals, the legislature is placed in a standard- or
rule-making role that provides law for similar cases and, often, utilizes the
implementation expertise of other branches of state government.
III. APPLYING THE STRUCTURAL RATIONALE: A Two-STEP
UNDERSTANDING
In light of the text, history, and example discussed above, the term "special
law" should be interpreted as a restriction on the form legislation may take,
restricting the legislature's ability to identify objects. This, however, does not
mean that special-legislation doctrine should be eliminated. Rather, the
primary role of special-legislation doctrine is, or should be, to detect evasion
by identifying general laws that are functionally special. This two-step
understanding best implements the text in light of its structural rationale.
A. Step One: Formal Interpretation
Recall that special-legislation provisions restrict the ability to use "special"
laws in enumerated cases and require the use of "general" (i.e., not special)
laws when a general law can be made applicable. Interpreting these terms was,
of course, what launched the last part's inquiry.
The term "special" should be interpreted to refer only to laws that identify
objects. With that interpretation, these provisions would restrain the form of
legislation. Laws that speak in terms of standards or criteria would not be
special. They would be general. Stated differently, laws that create or use
classifications (which are all laws that do not identify objects) would be
general. This interpretation fits the structural rationale underlying these
provisions, makes sense historically and textually, and provides legislators,
judges, and citizens with guidance.
The structural rationale demands only that the legislature translate
individual circumstances into general laws, requiring legislatures to frame their
judgments in terms that apply to all similarly situated objects. When this
happens, the problems associated with individualized treatment are
eliminated.113 Thus, when the legislature in my divorce hypothetical writes a
divorce law that uses my circumstances as a foundation for a general law, there
is little danger of the problems that attend individualized treatment and many
benefits that emerge. There may be a danger that the circumstances the
legislature chooses to translate into standards or criteria will be bad policy, but
113. See Albert M. Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in the Bhnois Cases, 1 ILL. L. REv.63, 79
(1906) (while not drawing a distinction between special and functionally special laws, observing that a
restriction on identification "can hardly be said [to] serve no good purpose").
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there is nothing special about that danger. After all, legislation is often a
response to individuals' problems. What makes legislation special is the
structural problem that accompanies legislation tending only to an individual's
problem.
Historically and textually, this interpretation also makes sense.114 As I
have explained above, individualized treatment was clearly the problem. And
if a special law is a law that identifies its objects, then the text simply says that
a legislature may not identify objects in the enumerated cases, and it must
refrain from doing so when it can.
This interpretation also provides courts, legislators, and citizens with a
clear rule, justified by the underlying structural rationale it serves. Adopting
such an interpretation thus has the effect of clearing up our understanding of
these provisions. Perhaps as a consequence, but in any event, this also means
that special-legislation provisions perform a great deal of their work without
judicial oversight.115  Legislators can clearly avoid identifying objects, the
public knows not to ask for such legislation, and the need for judicial
enforcement should, thus, be limited.
In some cases, of course, individualized treatment will not present all of
the problems implicated in my divorce law. But this does not require a
different interpretation. Consider, for example, a higher-profile example.
Imagine a state law identifying a pipeline company called TransCanada and
requiring it to route a pipeline carrying diluted bitumen116 along a route that
avoids a large groundwater formation called the High Plains Aquifer. Many
people own shares of TransCanada, and they are distributed throughout the
state and beyond. It is being regulated because of the environmental risk it
poses to a large portion of the state. There are many constituents within the
state that would benefit financially from the construction of that pipeline. And
the pipeline would generate a large amount of tax revenue.
Individualized treatment of this matter is much different than
individualized treatment of my divorce. The matter is hardly the sort of subject
that will fly under the radar. The law identifies TransCanada, but it affects
many constituents. And many voices will offer evidence to the legislative body
114. Indeed, some early commentators refer to "special" laws as individualized laws, distinct from
laws that classify. See Morr, supra note 68, at 256-74; COOLEY, supra note 68, at 389-97.
115. On the importance of unlitigated provisions, see Sanford Levinson, Ameica's "Other
Constitutions": The Importance of State Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813,
813 n.1 (2010) (citing SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006)).
116. This hypothetical is based on a true story, but only loosely. See supra note 17. "Diluted
bitumen is one of the types of crude oil derived from the Canadian oil sands in Alberta, Canada. It is a
combination of bitumen, the heavy oil that is extracted from the oil sands, and a diluent, which is usually
natural gas condensate, naphtha or mix of other light hydrocarbons. The diluted mixture improves the
quality of bitumen and allows the crude oil (referred to as "dil-bit" in the industry) to meet pipeline
product quality specifications posted with federal regulators so the crude oil flows through transmission
pipelines." Pipeline Transportation of Diluted Bitumen from the Canadian Oil Sands, AOPL,
http://www.cepa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Facts-About-Pipeline-Transportation-of-Diluted-
Bitumen.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). AOPL, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF DILUTED BITUMEN
FROM THE CANADIAN OIL SANDS, available at http://www.cepa.com/about-cepalindustry-information.
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in support of their arguments. In short, there is little risk that the legislature
will insufficiently scrutinize the merits of this case. At least, there is little risk
that the legislature's representative composition will impede its investigation
and judgment.
From this, one could conclude that laws naming high-profile objects should
not be regarded as special because, functionally, such laws do not raise
significant legislative-scrutiny concerns. However, given the history of these
provisions, the absence of a legislative-scrutiny concern is not necessarily a
problem. The formal restraint can be imposed in high-profile cases on
prophylactic grounds. Because naming is so problematic in many cases and
resulted in so many problems historically, the absence of some of those
problems in a particular case of an identified object is not important.
Under this line of reasoning, the special-legislation provision imposes a
formal restraint on the legislature to refrain from naming names in all cases.
There are also important benefits that follow this restriction, even in high-
profile cases. As with my divorce law, restricting the legislature's ability to
identify TransCanada still has profound effects. Once the legislature
articulates its concerns in terms of standards or criteria, it avoids an appearance
of impropriety. It will also not be as likely to spend time on individual cases
like this one in the future, after having provided a more generally applicable
law. Such a law will also extend the legislature's judgment to other similarly
situated objects. By forcing the legislature into this policymaking role, the
restriction will also likely create a role for other branches of government to
implement the law. Thus, when special-legislation provisions are interpreted
to restrict the form lawmaking takes, they solve the structural problems a
particular case presents and produce important benefits, including a clear rule
for legislatures to follow. However, the clarity of this interpretation does not
foreclose the need for judicial review.
B. Step Two: Functional Implementation
The second step to understanding special-legislation provisions is to view
their doctrine as implementing the interpretation adopted above. When the
doctrine is viewed in this light, the tests described above fit together as a
coherent doctrine. While I have not found a state that has stitched the doctrine
and text together in this way, it accounts for some states' approaches.
However, some states are going well beyond the structural rationale of these
provisions by applying classification tests to general legislation that raises no
suspicion of individualized treatment. Such cases effectively police some ill-
defined notion of individual rights that the text and its underlying structural
rationale do not support.
Given the primary goal of these provisions-to restrict legislatures from
117. I consider the prospect of sufficient legislative scrutiny as it relates to functionally special laws
below, in Part IV.B.1.
118. CL Kales, supra note 113, at 63, 79.
66 [ Vol. 40:1
State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation
identifying objects-one could question why judicial review and a special-
legislation doctrine are necessary. They are necessary because legislators have
good reasons for wanting to concern themselves with individual cases. In
comparison with policymaking, individualized lawmaking is easier and, thus,
tempting. It may, for example, avoid the prospect of extended debate, put the
legislator in the good graces of his or her constituents, and discharge the
legislator of a duty to think about broader consequences, future consequences,
and conflicting policies.
Of course, special-legislation provisions were added, in part, because of
these temptations. Constitutional drafters wanted legislatures to take up the
more difficult task of policymaking. But the temptation persists. Just as
legislators had good reasons for wanting to provide individualized treatment
with special laws, they continue to have good reasons for providing
individualized treatment with general laws. Thus, the formal interpretation
does not adequately guard against the prospect of individualized treatment and
the structural problems it presents. Rather, fully implementing these
provisions must also involve a doctrine that handles the temptation to evade
the special-legislation provision.119
Legislation that applies to only one or a few objects is some evidence that
a law was written for an individual case. However, sometimes such legislation
is dealing with a problem that is unique to a class of that size. Thus, the
doctrine must be careful to avoid falsely detecting instances of individualized
lawmaking. Indeed, the constitutional drafter's judgment was only to limit
instances of individualized lawmaking in which the object was identified. The
doctrine, and the doctrine alone, expands the inquiry to cases in which a
general law appears suspicious.
To strike a balance between the need for narrow laws and the prospect of
evasion, the doctrine should detect functionally special laws. It does this
through the closed-class and class-legislation tests. A special law involves the
use of a name that operates to identify a very small class, closes the class to
future entry and denies its coverage to similarly situated objects. A
functionally special law, then, could be said to involve a similarly sized class
that restricts its coverage in the same way. Both the closed-class test and the
119. Some early cases were explicitly geared at evasion, apparently operating under the notion that
special legislation was that legislation which named its object. Thus, in Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417,
418-19 (1885), the court evaluated legislation creating superior courts in cities with populations
exceeding 25,000 inhabitants. The court concluded:
If this act were a clear and unequivocal attempt to evade the constitutional
inhibition, and create a superior court for one particular city, we would
unhesitatingly accede to the views of counsel. Such legislation, although the purpose
be disguised by the use of general language, is not to be tolerated. But, construing
all the provisions of the statute together, we cannot discover any such attempted
evasion. Denver, it is true, is the only city to which the act at present applies. But
the legislature clearly intended to provide for places that may hereafter acquire the
population mentioned. The law is general, and is unlimited as to time in its
operation. There is nothing unreasonable in the supposition that other towns and
cities within the state will eventually contain 25,000 inhabitants. Whenever this size
is attained by such municipal corporations, the act becomes applicable thereto.
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class-legislation test get at this problem, identifying instances in which other
objects should be included. This search for special laws masquerading as
general ones detects instances of evasion.
I analyze how the doctrine does this below, but an initial word of caution
is in order. The discussion below presents special-legislation doctrine as
involving multiple parts: (1) an individualized-treatment trigger, (2) a closed-
class test, (3) a class-legislation test, and (4) a possible inquiry into legislative
history. All of this could be taken as too complicated to effectively guide
decisionmakers. It is not. From a legislature's perspective, the general rule
should be kept in mind: If legislation applies to only one or a few present
objects, then the class it creates must be open to future entry and the class
needs to include all relevant members.
From a judicial perspective, the inquiry may involve many shades of gray.
The appearance of individualized treatment may be questionable because the
legislation extents to more than one object. Class membership may be
somewhat open and somewhat closed. And classification criteria may make
some sense, but appear questionable. In such close cases-cases that are likely
to be litigated -even the best doctrinal structure is likely to break down. The
primary benefit of the structural rationale comes to bear in those close cases.
It provides guidance. It gives courts a better understanding of what dangers
special legislation presents and the way in which the doctrinal tests implement
those concerns.
1. Class Size
The primary indicium of evading a rule against individualized treatment is
present class size. If legislation applies1 20 to only one (or very few) existing
objects, then a concern arises that the legislation was created to deal only with
that object. And, as explained above, dealing with only one object poses
significant problems in legislatures, the most important of which is the risk of
insufficient legislative scrutiny. In such circumstances, the law should trigger
some sort of a test to check for evasion.
Considerations of class size have been met with somewhat confusing
results in the case law. Historically, early courts explicitly considered class size
in their analysis. 121 Factually, many successful special-legislation challenges
involve a class of one or only a few members.122 But most modem courts have
120. It is important to realize that individualized treatment can be given through exclusion as well
as inclusion. See Ireland, supra note 8, at 291. That is, the exclusion of an individual from a law's general
coverage can qualify as individualized treatment, just as a law that positively covers the same individual.
Similarly, an amendment to a general law that operates to exclude a single object could qualify as well.
I use the term "applies" to simplify matters.
121. "It is to be remembered that one alone may constitute a class as well as a thousand; but the
fewer there are in a class the more closely will courts scrutinize an act if its classification constitutes an
evasion of the constitution." Loew v. Hagerle Bros., 33 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 1948); accordHamlin
v. Ladd, 14 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1944).
122. See, e.g., City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (population on a certain date
operated to restrict a parking-tax enabling provision to three cities).
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not been willing to articulate class size as a trigger for judicial review.123
Indeed, much of the case law that mentions class size runs to the contrary.
However, many of these declarations should be examined more closely. If a
case concludes that class size is irrelevant when a class of one is open and the
law passes a class-legislation test, such an observation should not be taken too
far. Class size did not matter in the outcome of those cases, where the
classification passed muster. But if it had not passed muster, class size is the
only factor that gives rise to a concern for evasion.124
The only cases that overlook class size are those involving large classes that
were deemed special because they failed a class-legislation test or involved a
closed class.125 A good example is Best v. Taylor Machine Works, discussed
above, in which the court struck down a tort-reform measure as special
legislation. That legislation had no indicia of evasion. There is no reason, in
other words, to regard the law in that case as functionally special.
To illustrate a general law raising a concern for individualized lawmaking,
reconsider an adaptation of the TransCanada legislation: The state legislature
passes a law requiring all pipeline companies to seek approval of an
administrative agency for routing pipelines through the state. Assume as well
that the law only practically impacts a company called TransCanada, which is
on the verge of finalizing plans for a pipeline. Such a law would appear to
involve a small class, just as it would if it named TransCanada. Thus, the small
class size triggers a concern for individualized treatment that is in need of
further review.
Assessing the number of objects a law covers at the time of its passage
raises can sometimes raise difficult questions. But it is imperative to make this
inquiry because the concern for individualized treatment is all that justifies
further review. If the law covers many other pipeline companies, there is no
evasion concern. All the legislation would be in the absence of such evidence
is a law that, like all others, involves a classification. There would be, to put it
tritely, nothing special about it.
123. By way of exception, see Penn. Turnpike, 899 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 2006).
124. Binney's 1894 observations are consistent with this understanding: "If the classification be
valid, the number of members in a class is wholly immaterial." BINNEY, supra note 8, at 84.
Importantly, Binney did not go so far as to say that class size was irrelevant. Rather, his observation
fits an evasion inquiry: class size is relevant when the classification criteria have an insufficient relation
to some legitimate end. Id.
125. In some instances, these cases can be explained by reasonable responses to the appearance of
arbitrariness. Take, for example, Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800 (Minn. 1887). There the court was
faced with an arbitrary distinction between counties in a law that dealt with the removal of county seats.
The court recounted those cases in which classes of one dealing with municipalities were struck down
under special-legislation provisions because their classifications were arbitrary. Those cases, however,
explicitly mentioned evasion. The court, without consulting the constitutional text, concluded that
because the classification before it was arbitrary, the legislation was special. Id. Of course, without the




Once a court determines that a general law only applies to a very small
class, it must determine whether or not the legislature has evaded the
restriction. The closed-class test represents one way of detecting evasion. Just
as a special law creates a closed class, a general law closing its class and
applying to one object (or very few) is functionally special.126
Consider, for example, a hypothetical pipeline law with a closed class.
Assume this law requires administrative review for all pipeline companies that
have an application pending before the U.S. State Department as of October
15, 2011. TransCanada is the only pipeline company that meets this definition.
Such a law is, functionally, no different than a law that identifies TransCanada.
As the Ohio Supreme Court said of a similar statute, "The effect of the act
would have been precisely the same if the [object] had been designated by
name instead of by the circumlocution employed.", 1 Such laws present all of
the dangers of special legislation. Indeed, if the legislature wanted to name
TransCanada then it should have. It cannot, however, evade the provision by
framing the law generally and closing the class.
The legislature is, of course, not without a means of further limiting the
scope of such a law. If there is some legitimate reason why pipeline companies
like TransCanada should be regulated, and others not regulated, then the
legislation should articulate those reasons as further conditions. If, for
example, this company deserves regulation because it will involve a high-
capacity pipeline of 25" or more, then that should be included as a classification
criterion. This expands the law's coverage to all similar pipelines. If, however,
the criteria create a class that applies to only one present object (or very few),
then opening the class does not appear sufficient to allay evasion concerns.
3. Class-legislation Tests
Class-legislation tests, which require that legislative classifications involve
distinctions among objects that are relevant to some legitimate public purpose,
also detect laws that are functionally special when applied to legislation that
covers one existing object (or very few).1 28 As with a special law, a functionally
126. South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 693 (Ind. 2003), does not use this test to detect
functionally special laws. Rather, it uses this test to determine whether a "a general law can be made
applicable." (quoting IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23). The problem with hitching the doctrine to that text
is that it offers no opportunity to justify a closed class. This framework does. See infra. Part IV.C.
127. State ex. rel. City of Columbus v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592, 607-08 (1877). See also Note,
Constitutionality of Classifcation of Cities, 16 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1902) (stating that the mere fact that
there is but one city in a class should not raise a problem, but if there is no possibility of another
entering, "then clearly the intent for its special effect is revealed").
128. South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 693 (Ind. 2003) purports to use its class-legislation test
to determine whether "a general law can be made applicable." (quoting IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23).
However, its test for general or special status turns on the arbitrariness of the classification criteria. For
example, it concluded that population criteria isolating one county made a law special because the
classification "served no purpose other than to identify" that county. See also Alpa Psi v. Auditor of
Monroe County, 849 N.E.2d 1131 (Ind. 2006).
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special law withholds its coverage from other similarly situated objects. The
special law does it with a name (which also operates to close the class), but a
functionally special law can do it with other conditions.
This is an important conclusion. The structural rationale brings both the
closed-class test and the class-legislation tests together in pursuit of the same
underlying constitutional harm. Both tests, it turns out, are getting at the same
concern for individualized treatment by identifying instances of evasion.
Class-legislation tests geared at evasion deem a law functionally special
only when the classification appears to identify traits that are irrelevant to the
legislation's purposes. The inquiry is relatively weak because the conditions
the legislature employs may serve to identify classes that, although very small,
present problems that are unique. Thus, the inquiry tempers concerns for
evasion with the existence of problems involving very few existing objects.
Consider again, the hypothetical pipeline statute, this time regulating
pipelines of 25" or more. If TransCanada were the only company with a high-
capacity pipeline in the works when this legislation is passed, then it would
raise a suspicion of individualized treatment and would trigger judicial review.
The criteria should be tested to ensure that the legislation was not written to
deal only with TransCanada. The open class is one indication that is was not,
but the small present class still raises concerns. Of course, it could be that
TransCanada, and those like it that may come within the law's coverage in the
future, present unique circumstances that require a law that is not more
generally applicable.
The class-legislation test operates to distinguish between sound legislative
judgments and legislative evasion. For example, if the 25" criterion or the
pipeline-company criterion1 29 were irrelevant to the purposes underlying the
legislation, the appearance of evasion would emerge because the law would
isolate its coverage on one entity and fail to extend it to others similarly
situated. If the criteria were relevant-e.g., because pipelines of that size and
above present dangers to natural resources that smaller pipelines do not - then
the legislature has not written a functionally special law, but rather has written
the legislation to deal with a problem that is unique to TransCanada and other
future objects that will fall within its coverage.
The finer points of class-legislation tests raise a host of questions that I
consider in more depth in the next Part of this article. However, for present
purposes, it is sufficient to conclude that the structural rationale places class-
legislation tests within a larger framework that is textually supported. These
tests do not define special laws. Rather, they are one way of detecting general
laws that are functionally special.
4. Legislative History
Because the tests used in special-legislation doctrine are geared at evasion,
129. Both, of course, operate to identify the class upon which this legislation applies.
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legislative history would appear quite relevant. Of course, all of the well-
known dangers of digging into legislative history are present, like the ability to
manipulate it and the difficulty of getting an adequate understanding of debate
and investigation by reading a dry record.130 Most courts131 do not make direct
inquiries into the legislative history, probably for these reasons. But there is at
least one additional reason for proceeding into the legislative history with
caution.
In special-legislation cases, there is a unique concern for legislative history
that shows some attention to individual circumstances. Many legislative
histories will reveal some level of concern for individual problems. However,
restrictions on special legislation do not mean that individual circumstances are
beyond legislative cognizance. Rather, special-legislation restrictions require
only that those individual circumstances be translated into standards or criteria
that apply more broadly. Thus, any inquiry into legislative history should take
care to recognize that legislative attention to important areas of policy and
policy adjustment are often attributable to individuals who bring a matter to
their representative, asking for assistance. Concluding that legislation was
limited to a very small class simply because an individual came to the
legislature with a problem would cut too broad a path and ignore the practical
workings of a legislative body. This sort of evidence is marginally relevant to
the questions presented by special-legislation doctrine.
Stronger evidence would include a legislative history showing that
members were very concerned about whether anyone else would be brought
within the law's reach. This could indicate that the law was structured to
effectively deal with one individual's problem and framed in a way that ensured
it did only that.
For example, the hypothetical pipeline law might have a legislative history
in which many legislators stated their concerns about the pipeline company
that the law covers. However, that does not indicate a problem. Rather, what
the court should concern itself with is any indicia (that it concludes is reliable
enough) revealing an effort to effectively limit the coverage of the law to this
one company.
To illustrate, imagine the pipeline law with another condition in addition
to size. That is, the law restricts its coverage to those pipelines carrying diluted
bitumen. Evidence of individualized treatment would include pipeline
companies with pipelines larger than 25" in diameter arguing about adverse
economic impacts to them. If such evidence appeared, it might suggest that
the diluted-bitumen condition was placed in the law to focus the legislation on
this company.
130. See generally, Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REv. 423 (1988).
131. Some courts, however, do. Indiana, for example, has looked who sponsored the bill and an
emergency clause as relevant "circumstances surrounding the enactment." South Bend v. Kimsey, 781
N.E.2d 683, 693 (Ind. 2003). See also Hug v. City of Omaha, 749 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 2008); D-Co. v.
City of La Vista, 829 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 2013).
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Such a suggestion would appear strong, however, only if carrying diluted
bitumen was an arbitrary condition. Thus, for example, the evidence of
evasion would be weak if carrying diluted bitumen involves a higher risk of
environmental harm or if the substance has some correlation with other
legitimate concerns (e.g., pipeline companies carrying diluted bitumen are
uniquely situated to bear the costs of increased environmental regulation in
ways that pipelines carrying other substances are not). Thus, it could be that
the arbitrariness test adequately covers matters in some cases. But it could also
mean that the evidence gathered through a foray into legislative history could
inform those other tests, such as when a criterion appears somewhat arbitrary.
In sum, an appropriate interpretation of special-legislation provisions
restricts the legislature from identifying objects in legislation. An
implementing doctrine is necessary, however, because legislators are likely to
attempt to evade the restriction and provide individualized relief to their
constituents. To detect evasion, judicial review should be triggered if the
legislation applies to a class of one (or very few). If such a class is closed or
arbitrarily excludes other members, then the legislation is functionally special
and constitutes evasion. Legislative history can also be used to assist the court
with such an inquiry.132
This means that legislation involving larger classes should not be subject to
judicial review under these provisions. But this does not mean that equality
principles are insignificant. Equality is, of course, a valid concern. The point
is simply that these provisions are not equal-protection provisions in the sense
that some courts have made them out to be. There is, for instance, nothing
special about tort-reform legislationl 33 or payments to large numbers of
investors. 134  Other provisions of state constitutions or extra-constitutional
norms should be used to support broader equality doctrines.135
132. Of course, not all special laws or functionally special laws are unconstitutional. Recall that the
special-legislation restrictions only prohibit special legislation on enumerated subjects. In all other
matters, these provisions require that special laws be avoided when a general laws "can be made
applicable." Courts confronting special laws should observe this text, once they reach the special-
legislation conclusion. Thus, they should be careful not to strike down legislation simply because it is
special or functionally special. I turn to the complexity that this inquiry entails in part IV.C below.
133. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (striking down a statutory cap on
compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries in personal injury actions).
134. Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836 (Neb. 1991) (striking down a statute providing payment to
defrauded investors of industrial loan companies). Haman is, however, a harder case than would first
appear. There were, after all, only three industrial loan companies that fell within the scope of that act.
The court, however, focused on the class of depositors to whom the legislature provided relief. On that
view, there was nothing special about that legislation.
135. Special-legislation provisions, of course, serve egalitarian ends in two ways. First, because
these provisions require legislatures to speak in terms that classify objects, these provisions help achieve
some level of equality. Once the legislature speaks in terms that identify the legislation's objects
through criteria or standards, all similarly situated objects are treated similarly. Thus, people like me
get divorces. People who are not like me, will not. Pipeline companies like TransCanada are given
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IV. RECONSIDERING SPECIAL-LEGISLATION DOCTRINE
What I have said above develops the landscape of special-legislation
provisions and their doctrine as it pertains to the term "special law." The
structural rationale ties the doctrine together, links it to the text, and narrows
it to cases involving evasion. In this part, the article discusses four aspects of
special-legislation doctrine in more depth. In section A, it briefly examines the
parameters of the class-legislation test geared at evasion, distinguishing it from
rational-basis review under the 14th Amendment. In section B, it explores
three possible doctrinal innovations. In section C, it discusses the restraint on
special and functionally special legislation, revealing how the rest of the
constitutional text affects the doctrine above.
A. Class-legislation Tests and The Judiciary's Role
The details of class-legislation tests present one of the murkiest areas of
special-legislation doctrine. To this point, I have been content to use the
structural rationale to cast this test in the role of an evasion test that courts
(should) apply to legislation raising a suspicion of individualized lawmaking.
However, the structural rationale informs class-legislation tests in two more
ways. First, it informs the finer points of these tests, counseling in favor of a
test that is in some ways more demanding than rational-basis review under the
14th Amendment.136  Second, the structural rationale justifies this more
demanding review.
1. The Finer Points of Class-Legislation Tests
There are at least three common inquiries that courts undertake in
conjunction with class-legislation tests that are worth exploring briefly here:
(1) identifying the legislation's purposes, (2) examining the factual basis for
distinguishing between those objects included and excluded from the
legislation's coverage, and (3) exploring the relevance of those distinctions to
the legislation's purposes.
similar treatment, but those that are not like it, are not. By modifying the form of lawmaking, special-
legislation provisions generate legislation that extends individual treatment to others.
Second, because these provisions require legislatures to write broader standards and rules, they create
more opportunities to check legislation for equality under typical equal-protection jurisprudence or a
similar state equal-rights provision. Take, for example, the divorce hypothetical. Special-legislation
provisions require the legislature to articulate standards or criteria that identify who should get a
divorce. In the hypothetical case, these standards and criteria are a translation of the introducing
legislator's reasons for thinking I deserve a divorce and reflect the views of the body, given the
legislative scrutiny that ensues. If my race or my gender were articulated as reasons, then equal
protection would eliminate the inequality. Making an equal-protection challenge would be much more
difficult if the legislation simply named me.
136. Of course, it cannot solve the problem of courts employing a test haphazardly. See, e.g., Clark,
supra note 16, at 653-54 (criticizing the Kansas Supreme court for inconsistently deferring to legislative
factual judgments and taking judicial notice of facts that indicate it is using its own policy preferences
to decide cases).
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With the structural rationale in mind, and its corollary concern for
evasiveness, one can better understand how a court should undertake these
inquiries. I discuss each inquiry briefly below, but my point is not to exhaust
all possible details.137  Rather, these are some initial thoughts on how
classification review should be undertaken if the concern is evasion.
Legislation's Purposes
To start, the court should identify the purposes of the challanged
legislation.13 8 This is a notoriously difficult subject. I frame it as a problem of
identifying the means through which purposes will be detected because that is
the main problem confronting this doctrine. Equal-protection doctrine under
the 14th Amendment, of course, uses the concept of legislation's purposes
differently. At times, it requires that class criteria serve an important or
compelling purpose in order to justify their use. With an evasion inquiry, there
is little reason to take such an approach. The main question to be answered,
after all, is whether the classification criteria were used for no other reason
than to narrow the class to one. 139
137. One such problem is that of individual and cumulative testing. While I address it in this note,
discussing it in the text would take the analysis too far afield. Each criterion should probably be tested
individually, to ensure relevance, and collectively to ensure that the confluence of relevant factors was
not used to limit the scope of the law to an individual object. Individual and collective analysis of
multiple criteria has been a difficult issue for courts to grapple with. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT &
LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 298-99 (7th
ed. 2009). The structural account would, however, indicate that collective attention is warranted to
detect instances of evasion.
The most obvious example of when two relevant criteria could be combined to limit applicability to one
object are instances in which the criteria are duplicative relative to a particular concern. This happens,
for example, when one criterion is subsumed within another broad criterion. The appearance of two
independently relevant criteria like this would suggest they were combined to limit the law's reach to
only one object. See Town of Secaucus v. Hudson Co. Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1993).
138. By "purpose" I mean the goals legislation reasonably appears to achieve. I choose the term
"legislation's purpose" rather than "legislative purpose" for this reason. The term allows this purpose
to be shown by those things that convention places within the institution of legislation, like committee
reports, preambles, and the like. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 321 (1985). I do not
refer to any sort of psychological understanding of purpose. Personifying legislative bodies and
saddling courts with inquiries concerning multi-member bodies' "motive", "intent", or "purpose" is
fraught with difficulty. See id. at 321-24. See generally John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative
Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005).
Another way of thinking of legislation's purpose is to ask whether the effects of a statute played
a causative role in its adoption. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory
State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1439 n.128
(1994). Often this sort of inquiry is used to judge whether or not an illicit effect played such a causative
role in the law's creation that it should be deemed unconstitutional. Inquiries that care only about illicit
effects, however, do not require such an inquiry. Inquiries that make unconstitutionality turn on illicit
purpose, however, do require such an inquiry.
Yet other accounts can be found in BINNEY, supra note 8, at 59, 71-77; Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344-47 (1949); C. Edwin Baker,
Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 933, 972-84 (1983); Hans A. Linde, Due Process ofLawmaking55 NEB. L. REV. 197,213 (1976).
139. Indeed, it may run contrary to the evasion-based inquiry. As long as the characteristic exists
in fact and is relevant (i.e., serves a legitimate end), it would appear the legislature did not act evasively.
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For example, there is little reason in our pipeline hypothetical to judge the
25" limitation or the pipeline limitation in terms of whether it is serving a
legitimate, important, or compelling interest. All this doctrine needs to do is
determine whether or not it is serving some purpose other than operating to
limit the classification to TransCanada. So the first step is, simply, identifying
the purposes from sources the court is willing to use.
In determining what the legislation's purposes are, a court need not
entertain any reasonable purpose supported by the text. An "any legitimate
purpose the judiciary can imagine" standard may overlook instances in which
a legislature framed a class evasively. For instance, if the judiciary explains
criteria with purposes that played no part in the legislation's creation, it may
unwittingly overlook evasion. Still, if the pipeline legislation included no
articulation of economic impact, then attributing the size limitation to a
concern for the differential economic impact on smaller pipelines might mask
an instance of evasion.
The solution to this sort of oversight is to examine only those purposes
appearing in whatever places the court concludes are within the convention for
determining legislation's purpose-purpose statements in the legislation,
committee reports, floor debates, or whatever. 140  When the legislature
provides this guidance, the inquiry is more robust than one where courts
imagine purposes that explain the criteria. It also operates to place a burden
on the legislature to articulate its purposes in the legislative process, and it
reduces the risk that the judiciary will be seen as grasping (or failing to grasp)
for purposes to support its conclusions.
Requiring a legislative articulation of purpose has another laudable aspect
to it. I have been careful thus far to use the term "purposes" instead of
"purpose." Legislation, like any other exercise in judgment, involves trade-offs
concerning multiple ends. Often courts characterize legislation's purpose as
singular and judge classifications with regard to that. This is a problem because
some criteria might reflect a middle ground between two legitimate, but
conflicting purposes.141 Focusing on one purpose to the exclusion of others can
An inquiry that requires criteria to serve a higher purpose necessarily means that some classifications
that server legitimate ends would be deemed unconstitutional. Such an inquiry would go beyond
evasion, detecting only a lack of sufficient justification, not necessarily an instance of evasion.
In fact, one could argue that the ends can be any ends. If the rationale articulated violates some
other constitutional norm, then those other constitutional norms can strike the law as unconstitutional.
Here, after all, the inquiry is wholly tied to distinguishing between laws that are framed in general terms
that are there to identify an object and those that are framed in general terms for other reasons. To
conclude, for example, that the ends must at least be legitimate is to introduce an array of constitutional
norms into the mix, some of which may be much different in state constitutions than they are as a matter
of federal constitutional law. See GILLMAN, supra note 79; Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836 (Neb.
1991).
140. Notably, the choice about what to include in the convention raises its own questions about the
ability of legislators to submarine legislation's purpose or artificially manufacture it.
141. See Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose; the Supreme Court and
Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 131-32; Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286
(1994) ("Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their
enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main
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result in invalidity when the legislature was simply balancing competing
policies. Instead, courts should expand the scope of the inquiry to consider the
more realistic prospect that many different goals, trade-offs, and compromises
are made in legislation, all for legitimate policy reasons. This can be
accomplished by allowing the legislature to articulate the purposes by which
the legislation will be judged.
Examining Factual Distinctions
With purposes in mind, the test next examines factual distinctions for their
existence. A judiciary could reasonably conclude to go beyond an "any state
of facts" line of inquiry to place some burden on the legislature to investigate
its hunches. This, in turn, allows a review of something that has come before
the legislative body rather than a wide-roaming inquiry driven by imagination
(or perceived to be driven by policy preference).142 The failure of a factual
distinction to emerge confirms that the legislation is evasive. The doctrine
may, however, need to give the legislature a fairly wide berth when reviewing
these matters. Factfinding that doesn't pan out, but which appeared
reasonable, doesn't indicate evasion as well as alleged distinctions that have no
basis in reality.
The inquiry should also focus on those excluded from the small class that
triggers review: "The test of a special law is the appropriateness of its
provisions to the objects that it excludes." 143 Underinclusiveness is, of course,
the problem with special legislation. Thus, a showing that members of the
small class covered by the law exhibit relevant factual differences is irrelevant
to an evasion inquiry. Overinclusiveness is not a problem from a special-
legislation perspective. 144
Consider, again, the pipeline hypothetical. Suppose an environmental
concern for groundwater supplies emerges from the conventional place and
constitutes a purpose of the legislation. Suppose that a concern for economic
impacts on small-capacity pipelines also emerges from the conventional place.
goal.").
142. See Clark, supra note 16, at 653-54 (criticizing the Kansas Supreme court for inconsistently
deferring to legislative factual judgments and taking judicial notice of facts that indicate it is using its
own policy preferences to decide cases).
143. Mooney v. Board. of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County., 299 A.2d 426 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1973), affd sub nom., 310 A.2d 502 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). The reasons for the
classification criteria cannot be adequately evaluated simply by a showing that those included are worth
regulating. Indeed, the merits of regulating those included are of little use to the question of evasion.
This observation is consistent with the notion that special laws withhold their treatment from others, as
well as the theory that this doctrine is gathering as much legislative attention as possible.
144. This distinguishes the inquiry from that occurring under the Equal Protection Clause of the
14'h Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in two ways. Underinclusiveness, not overinclusiveness, is
clearly the problem. And there is a means by which under- and over- inclusiveness can be separated-
by looking to the small class under review. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 301-03, § 18.2(b) (4th ed. 2007); Railway




The court's examination of factual distinctions would be undertaken with these
purposes in view. Thus, it would ask whether pipelines present environmental
risks that are different than other polluters. And it would ask whether or not
small pipelines are different than large pipelines in terms of their ability to bear
the costs associated with this regulation, their environmental risk, or both.
Again, deference may be in order.
Examining Relevance
The final part of this test overlaps to a large extent with the inquiry into
factual distinctions. That inquiry requires that factual distinctions be
substantiated. Of course, no one would identify a factual distinction for
substantiation without some purpose in view. Thus, the factual distinctions the
prior inquiry detects should be relevant to the purposes in view. 145
The point of mentioning the notion of relevance as a third inquiry,
however, is to simply stress the point and differentiate relevance from higher
standards. Some equal-protection tests, for example, require that classification
criteria be "necessary to" or "substantially serve" a governmental purpose.146
The need for this sort of heightening is absent from an evasion perspective.
With the pipeline law, for example, the purposes the legislature articulated
determined which factual distinctions to examine in the prior inquiry.
Relevance should emerge with such an inquiry. If it does not, then it suggests
the criteria were employed for no other reason than to identify
TransCanada.147
In sum, an appropriate standard for these inquiries-one upon which a
failure shows evasion-takes a legislation's purposes from a set of sources
145. For the sake of brevity, I do not address the problem of framing purposes at broad or narrow
levels and how that might impact the design of this test. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 So. CAL. L. REV. 481, 541-44 (2004) (discussing the breadth of justifications and how it factors
into equal-protection analysis and proposing the use of an "extracontextual inquiry" to determine
whether the "justification for official distinctions based on a trait is so general that it would support
discrimination based on that trait in virtually any context"). However, it could be that the focus of these
inquiries on distinctions, rather than focusing on the class included, drives purposes to be framed at
levels that show relevance.
146. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 144, at § 18.3.
147. Indeed, as with purpose, heightening the standard of relevance would tend to falsely detect
problems. Thus, if necessity were the standard, then the prospect of using other means casts doubt on
the use of the relevant criteria selected. So if there were ways of distinguishing pipelines' environmental
risks that are better than pipeline size, like performance history, then a court might conclude the
distinction employed was not relevant enough. The existence of another way to accomplish the
purpose, however, risks moving from a concern for evasion to one of sufficient justification. So long as
size matters, it would appear relevant and, thus, raise no concern.
Similarly, if no differential economic impact distinguishes large-capacity pipelines from small
ones, then the legislation would fail the second inquiry. Requiring that the distinction be very
significant risks going beyond the purpose of the inquiry.
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within the convention the court is willing to use, evaluates the classification
criteria for a low, but substantiated level of factual support, and judges their
relevance under a relatively weak standard. A legislative classification
identifying a single object (or very few) and failing to pass muster means the
legislation withholds its coverage from similarly situated objects and is
functionally special. If it passes muster, then the legislature responded to a
narrow problem that happened to be presented by very few existing objects
and the law should retain its general status.
2. A Process Justification
What I have said above belies the variations that one encounters in the
case law. Generally speaking, however, class-legislation inquiries range from
those that match deferential rational-basis review under the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal-protection clause to inquiries that are similar to the one I
have presented. From a federal equal-protection standpoint, a more
demanding review is somewhat alarming 48 when it is deployed (as is often the
case) to review economic or social legislation. Such a review appears
heightened relative to the run-of-the-mill rational-basis review that the U.S.
Constitution would demand. 149
The structural rationale, however, provides a justification for a more
invasive judicial role here. 50  Recall that legislation triggering this review
applies only to a very narrow class -something akin to a class of one. Such a
class raises questions about legislative scrutiny. Thus, one can justify judicial
review as a means of ensuring that the legislation was the product of a
legitimate legislative process. To the extent the inquiry rises above rational-
basis review and puts the judiciary in a less-than-deferential role, such concerns
can be met with the underlying structural rationale for these provisions: the
legislature is not well-suited to write laws dealing with very narrow classes. The
judiciary may, of course, not be well-suited to write laws either, but its role as
a check on legislatures in these sorts of circumstances can be justified on
process grounds.' 5 ' Notably, however, judicial review of legislation involving
148. It is not, however, alarming to everyone. Goldberg, supra note 145, has argued that class-
legislation review from state courts is a better approach to equal-protection jurisprudence than the
standard three-tiered approach. See also Saunders, supra note 69.
149. One can legitimately question the need to answer such a criticism. On the one hand, it is clearly
not the case that a more stringent review here runs afoul of equal-protection doctrine. This is not equal-
protection doctrine. But it could run afoul of the reasons that underlie present rational-basis review,
like judicial competency. Interestingly, however, judicial competency in state courts is often not a
question involving democratic accountability. I consider the impact of inter-branch lawmaking capacity
below, in Part IV.B.3.
150. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 461 ("If the prohibition against special laws exists, however, to
prevent corrupt legislatures from adopting corrupt legislation, then it would be silly to leave its
enforcement to the legislature").
151. For constitutional-law scholars who are familiar with United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938), and the "discrete and insular minorities" idea of ratcheting up the standard of
review, this should sound a familiar note. The main difference between that take on equal-protection
doctrine and this take on special-legislation doctrine is the presence of a metric by which to identify the
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larger classes raises all of the objections that support a more deferential
standard, including relative institutional capacity.
Courts could, of course, opt for a modern version of rational-basis review,
akin to that found under the Fourteenth Amendment. And many have. This
is appropriately deferential to the legislature under many theories of how
judicial review should work. But, again, the institutional reasons for deferring
are missing in this context. The structural rationale reveals as much.
B. Doctnnal Innovations
The best understanding of the special-legislation doctrine is that it imposes
a check on evasive legislatures by testing general laws that apply to very small
classes. Such laws pose the dangers associated with special legislation. The
tests operate to confirm that such laws are functionally special. That is, general
laws failing these tests, like special laws, limit their application by withholding
similar treatment to similar objects that would enter the class in the future or
arbitrarily withhold their treatment from other similar present objects.
Three possible doctrinal modifications emerge from the idea that the
special-legislation doctrine identifies functionally special laws. The first would
bring more precision to the doctrine by reconfiguring the trigger for judicial
review. The second would expand the doctrine to larger classes by drawing
upon the notion of legislative scrutiny and reconfiguring the role of the closed-
class and class-legislation tests. The third would expand the overall scope of
the doctrine by considering the lawmaking capacity of other branches of state
government. I conclude the first modification would be theoretically sound,
though practically difficult. But I conclude the second and third would carry
the doctrine too far afield. Considering all three, however, deepens our
understanding of why some general legislation is a problem.
1. Triggering Judicial Review
The most important reason for triggering judicial review of general laws
applying to very small classes is the risk that such laws will lack sufficient
legislative scrutiny.152 This was a fundamental reason why special laws were
restricted. Legislative scrutiny is driven by public awareness, which is driven
by the impact of legislation. Without a sufficient impact and the awareness it
engenders, legislators are unlikely to scrutinize what is before them, likely to
engage in problematic logrolling, or both. There is also little reason to develop
information relevant to the merits of the legislation. And the lack of public
awareness was at least partly responsible for the appearance of impropriety
sort of legislation that should trigger a more demanding judicial review. See Jane S. Schacter, Ely at
the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marniage Debate, 109 M ICH. L. REv. 1363,
1391-92 (2011). As I explain in Part IV. B.1, below, that metric appears to be the narrow distribution
of constituency impact.
152. See supra Part H.A. The matter is somewhat akin to the idea of political powerlessness or
discreet and insular minorities. See supra note 151.
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associated with special laws.153
Indeed, public awareness is such an important aspect of special legislation
that some state constitutions allow special laws once the public is made aware
of the legislation.154 That is, special laws in many states are allowed if notice is
posted to inform the public about the legislation. In those states, public
awareness (or at least the prospect of it) guards against the primary danger of
special legislation. A similar approach can be taken with the special-legislation
doctrine when courts ask whether legislation is functionally special. Below,
this section explains how this could occur by rethinking the trigger for judicial
review.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that there may be no need for
rethinking the trigger. The closed-class and class-legislation tests do not
impose significant burdens on legislation. If the legislation applies to a very
small class, the class must simply remain open and not be arbitrary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine does operate to restrict legislative authority and,
thus, the need for judicial oversight should be demonstrated before a court
reviews legislation. Thus, it is worth exploring how one might design a more
accurate trigger.
Class size is a rough proxy for a risk of insufficient legislative scrutiny akin
to that accompanying special legislation. For example, the generally framed
pipeline regulation weaved throughout Part III is continuously exposed to
judicial review only because it presently applies to one object -TransCanada.
And it is reviewed even though there is no danger of a lack of legislative
scrutiny approaching that of archetypical special laws. Perhaps there are better
ways of triggering review that would tie the doctrine closer to its structural
rationale and the risk of insufficient legislative scrutiny.
Legislative scrutiny is a function of public awareness and its effect on
legislative debate. To assess public awareness, a court would need to concern
itself with the legislation's coverage, its indirect impacts on constituents, its
subject matter, its operation over time, and constituency cognizance. This list
is, of course, not exhaustive. But it at least sheds some light on what a finer-
grained analysis would entail.
Public awareness will vary depending upon the objects the law covers. A
law can deal with people, political subdivisions, entities, or whatever. Laws
that deal with large numbers of people and expose them to some legal
153. A great deal of it was also due to the appearance of legislation naming its object and the ex-
parte aspects of lawmaking, but some was surely attributable to the limited impact of the legislation.
This, in turn, likely fosters a sense of distrust borne of a perception that only some get access to the
legislative apparatus. See supra, Part II.
154. See supra note 99.
155. A court might resist arguments about constituent awareness in the absence of a notice
provision. After all, if the drafters did not include one, they may have made a judgment that awareness
was not enough. On the other hand, it is just as likely that the drafters concluded that a published public
notice was insufficient to establish such awareness. Thus, the absence of such a notice provision says




consequence are likely to garner attention from the public. But laws that deal
with other objects may or may not, depending upon the numbers of people
underlying those objects. In the case of a city, the matter would depend upon
the size of the city. In the case of an entity, the matter would depend upon, for
example, the number of owners. The point, of course, is to assess the
legislation's coverage in term of the electorate.
Assessing legislation's coverage considers the direct impact the legislation
has on the electorate. However, legislation can have small impacts within its
coverage and large impacts on people that it does not cover. Perhaps the best
way of determining the prospect of impact from coverage or more indirect
impacts is to consider the subject matter. Depending upon the subject
(taxation, environmental protection, economic regulation, social legislation,
etc.), one can get a better sense of the ramifications to both the covered
population and the indirect impacts on those not covered.
Temporal considerations associated with these aspects of legislation are
also significant. The prospect of future coverage or future effects serves to
garner public attention.156 The future applicability of legislation also has an
important impact on public awareness.
More direct evidence of constituency cognizance can also help determine
legislative scrutiny. In this regard, evidence of public outcry or support would
be relevant, as would evidence that emerges from evaluating the legislative
history. But a look at legislative history should be careful to detect evidence
of constituent involvement rather than debate among legislators. Nineteenth-
century constitution writers were concerned with the law's impact on
constituents and public awareness as drivers of legislative debate. The mere
existence of legislative attention, without the prospect of some impact on
legislators' constituencies, is little evidence of a legitimate process and may
simply indicate problematic logrolling.157
Public awareness is, however, only part of a legislative-scrutiny analysis.
In addition, public awareness must be distributed at a broad enough level to
engender legislative scrutiny within a representative lawmaking body. The
representative nature of the legislature raises geographic considerations that
are relevant to the question of legislative scrutiny. Consider, for example, my
divorce law. There, the lack of legislative scrutiny was tied not only to the
limited impact of the legislation, but also to its geographic distribution. Only
one or two legislative districts were impacted. Even if other constituents had
some reason to care, their attention would be unlikely to generate legislative
scrutiny if they were not from other legislative districts where they could get
the attention of their representatives. Thus, a finer-grained trigger should take
156. This aspect of public scrutiny is also reflected within the closed-class test. Its consideration
here uses the concern to help justify judicial review.
157. For a similar political-process perspective of laws that make changes to evidentiary or
procedural laws in a way that masks their effect on substantive law, see Martin H. Redish & Christopher
R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation ofPowers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the
Political Theory ofUnited States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 437 (2006).
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into account the geographic distribution of impacts across legislative
districts,1s looking for instances in which the distribution is isolated to one
district (or very few districts).159
An example of how this would work helps illustrate the consequences of
reconfiguring the trigger. Consider, again, the generally framed pipeline
legislation. Above, the legislation triggered review even though it was general
because it applied only to one pipeline company. With a reconfigured trigger,
this law would get no judicial review under the special-legislation doctrine
because the size of its class would not trigger judicial review. Rather, the
political attention and impact of the legislation would serve to alleviate
concerns about legislative scrutiny and, thus, a court would leave the matter to
legislative judgment.160 This would be true even if the class it created were
closed or arbitrarily defined. This is acceptable because such a law could not
be functionally special-it would lack one of the key attributes of such a law
and, thus, eliminate one of the key reasons for extending the restriction on
special laws to general laws.
One could object to this result on grounds that sound similar to evasion. 161
That is, allowing this law to escape judicial review allows the legislature to
effectively write a law for TransCanada without identifying TransCanada.
Indeed, it does. But the law is not special, as it would be if it identified
TransCanada.162 And it cannot be functionally special because it raises no risk
158. Similarly, legislation that involves a set of interests that are located beyond the state's
boundary pose a legislative-scrutiny problem. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 431 (3d ed. 2006) (mentioning the political process and virtual
representation theories of the dormant commerce clause doctrine); BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.06 (2d ed. 2013).
159. This becomes particularly relevant with political subdivisions. Those that exist wholly within
one legislative district create legislative scrutiny concerns when they are identified with a special law.
Those that cross district boundaries do not create as much of a problem, but the point at which enough
legislative districts are implicated to alleviate concerns for legislative scrutiny is unclear.
A city involving multiple districts may still pose legislative scrutiny concerns. Legislators may, for
instance, band together to act as one and shield the matter from legislative scrutiny through criteria that
effectively name their city. This raises nearly the same concerns as individualized treatment. In any
event, these laws are probably better evaluated with regard to the term "local" because it may involve
additional concerns. But individualized treatment of such objects raises questions of legislative scrutiny
that are within the scope of that term.
160. Similarly, under this approach, a law involving a large class with an impact that is isolated
would cause concern and be subject to review to ensure the legislative apparatus did not malfunction.
161. One could also object on grounds that ring of justification. That is, legislative scrutiny should
not justify laws that close their classes or are arbitrary. That argument, however, misses the point. The
idea is not one of ex-post justification. Rather, it is one of determining when judicial review and its
effect on legislation should be triggered. It thus puts the cart before the horse to argue justification.
The questions of closed-classes or arbitrariness are logically subsequent to the question of whether
judicial review is necessary.
162. This may appear somewhat odd because a law that names TransCanada would clearly be
special, even though it creates no risk of insufficient scrutiny. But restricting special laws carries with
it such a long history of abuse that a prophylactic rule is justified. And the constitutional text demands
that special laws be restricted. When the doctrine extends the rules on special laws to general laws, it
must remain tied to the reasons why special laws are a problem. So regardless of how a bill naming
TransCanada would be treated, a bill that does not name it can only trigger review if it raises the
concerns underlying special laws. An expanded trigger reveals that there is no such concern here.
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of insufficient legislative scrutiny. Testing the law's classification for open
status or arbitrariness is therefore beyond the scope of the special-legislation
doctrine.
In the end, a finer-grained trigger geared at the risk of insufficient
legislative scrutiny is theoretically sound. But it may be fraught with too many
difficulties. It raises a number of considerations involving geography,
coverage, indirect impacts, temporal considerations, subject matter, and
constituency awareness. The very-small-class-size trigger, on the other hand,
is easy for the judiciary to apply and it gives legislators guidance as to when
they should expect judicial review. That review is not altogether demanding,
but understanding the prospect of such review is important to establishing a
record that will enable the judiciary to see the legislature's work. A trigger
that is more like a standard risks uncertainty. If the standard becomes
uncertain and difficult to apply, the judiciary is given an opportunity to
overreach (or exposed to the risk that it will be seen as overreaching).
2. Enhancing Legislative Scrutiny
The most basic problem underlying special laws is the risk of insufficient
legislative scrutiny. The concern for legislative scrutiny is, in turn, tied to the
impacts legislation has. Thus, one could frame the problem of special
legislation as involving legislation that was crafted to avoid legislative scrutiny
by confining the legislation's impact to an identified object. Functionally
special legislation could be said to pose the same problem.
This idea of limiting impacts reveals a different account of the special-
legislation doctrine. That is, the doctrinal tests can be understood as ensuring
that as much legislative scrutiny is brought to bear on a piece of legislation as
possible under the circumstances. Opening the classification and requiring the
extension of the legislation's treatment to similarly situated objects extends the
impacts of the legislation. This, in turn, raises public awareness and, thus, has
a beneficial impact on the prospect of legislative scrutiny. It also
accommodates the legitimate need to deal with problems affecting very small
classes by operating to ensure that the impacts extend as far as can reasonably
be expected under the circumstances.
This understanding of the role the special-legislation doctrine plays is
consistent with the structural rationale for these provisions. However, this
understanding should not be taken too far. Even though the special-legislation
doctrine could be said to extend the impacts of legislation, this should not mean
that special-legislation provisions require the extension of impacts in all
legislation. The key limiting factors are the constitutional text, its restriction
on special laws, and the structural rationale that underlies it.
Special laws, of course, involve restrictions on the impact of legislation.
But not all legislation with limited impacts is special legislation. With special
legislation, the impact is so narrow that there are concerns for legislative
capacity and appearances of impropriety that are implicated by the very low
level of legislative scrutiny likely to ensue. When the legislative classification
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expands, the danger of insufficient scrutiny does not exist at nearly the same
degree.
The one thing a law providing individualized treatment has in common
with a law involving a larger closed class or a larger arbitrarily selected class is
that a portion of the votes supporting it was attributable to the limitation. If
the special-legislation doctrine were expanded to larger classes, it would no
longer police legislation that runs the risk of flying under the radar. Rather,
special-legislation provisions would enable the judiciary to strike down
legislation that passes because marginal votes were obtained by closing the
class to future growth or arbitrarily limiting its size. The concern for special
legislation does not extend that far. 1 63
3. Considering Inter-branch Lawmaking Capacity
Other branches of state government are relevant to special-legislation
provisions, even though these provisions only apply to the legislature.164
Recall that the concern for legislative capacity grew out of the ability of the
legislature to verify the claims that an individual made when coming to the
legislature for individualized treatment. Other branches are better suited to
performing that task, so these provisions were adopted to push individualized
attention to those branches. The concern attending individualized treatment
can therefore be explained in terms of legislative capacity or expanded into a
judgment that another branch of state government is more suited to a
particular task than the legislature. If the concern for legislative capacity can
be broadened to a notion of inter-branch suitability, the lawmaking capacity of
the other branches of government would be highly relevant to the question of
163. Constitutional provisions that reflect broader concerns for equality, however, might. Thus,
there is an argument for using this sort of a process-based rationale for provisions susceptible to broader
application. Justice Jackson offered this rationale for the Equal Protection Clause in Railway Express,
concurring with the Court's judgment, but rejecting the notion that underinclusiveness was not a
problem:
Invocation of the equal protection clause .... merely means that the prohibition or
regulation must have a broader impact . ... The framers of the Constitutional knew,
and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guarantee
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of
law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those
officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected.
Railway Express Agency v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1447-48 (2d ed. 1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986) (arguing that special interest legislation should be broadened judicially); Ethan
Klingsberg, Contextualizing the Calculus of Consent: Judicial Review of Legislative Wealth Transfers
in a Transition to Democracy andBeyond, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 303, 337-40 (1994) (explaining the
equal treatment rationale of the Hungarian Constitutional Court).
164. Local governments are probably also relevant, but I do not address the vertical separation-of-
powers issues that may arise from these provisions. See supra, note 42.
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what sorts of general legislation are problematic. Thus, the judiciary's165 and
the executive's roles would be relevant to the proper scope to give special-
legislation provisions.16 6
Expanding or contracting the scope of the special-legislation doctrine on
this basis would likely take the form of triggering review in cases of larger
classes, ratcheting up the standards for excluding marginally relevant class
members, or both. In the end, however, the suitability of other branches does
not indicate superiority relative to the legislative branch. Thus, while these
observations are interesting and shed some light on the question of why
legislative bodies present unique structural problems relative to other
branches, they do not constitute a convincing case for expanding special-
legislation restrictions.
Inter-branch suitability is a difficult concept to pin down, especially in the
state system. Unlike the federal system, where democratic accountability only
acts as a check on the legislature and the chief executive, many states elect
judges (or vote to remove them) and many other actors within the executive
branch are directly elected. Considering their suitability to make law, vis-A-vis
a legislature, is therefore not a question of democratic accountability. What it
is a function of, however, remains unclear.
Perhaps the key distinction between these democratically accountable
bodies and the legislature lies in the representative nature of each branch.
Legislators are prone to logrolling (of the extreme sort seen in special
legislation, or of the modest form seen in legislative dealmaking) because they
each represent relatively large numbers of constituents and have plenary
lawmaking power. Thus, narrow legislation that does not affect a member's
constituency is likely to garner a vote from that legislator, in exchange for a
vote on some other matter that has a similar low cost. And because the
legislative body has plenary authority, this trading can occur across a broad
range of subjects.
In other branches, this sort of exchange doesn't occur for two primary
reasons: First, there may be a narrow scope of legal subjects upon which the
branch (or set of actors within the branch) has lawmaking authority. Second,
the branch (or set of actors within the branch) may have a different
representative composition.
Take, for example, the lawmaking authority of the judiciary. An elected
judge is responsible to all the voters in his or her judicial district, but judges do
165. There is a great deal of evidence that constitutional drafters envisioned a robust lawmaking
court. See TARR, supra note 22, at 122-24. Many state judges are, of course, elected and were made so
during the same era in which special-legislation provisions were written into state constitutions. For
the relationship between state legislatures and judiciaries, and how it differs in many ways from the
federal system, see Michael L. Buenger, Fiction by Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial
Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 571 (2008).
166. Alabama's constitution appears to recognize the link between judicial power and the definition
of special laws, implying that special laws encroach on the judicial function: "No special .. . law. .. shall
be enacted ... when the relief sought can be given by any court of this state ..... ALA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 105. Also, many pre-adoption cases involving special legislation were resolved on separation of
powers principles. See supra, note 110.
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not come together to make decisions at the trial-court level. So while they may
have a fairly wide range of subjects upon which they can act, the scope of their
electorate is relatively broad with diverse and often conflicting interests.
Moreover, while they make important decisions in individual cases, their
operational structure does not often expose them to broader questions than
those presented in a particular case.167 While they may effectively write the
law for a particular set of circumstances, they generally do not write law
beyond the set of facts they are faced with.
At the supreme-court level, matters are somewhat different. There, a
representative democracy exists, but the representative composition is
different than in the legislature because there are so few judicial districts.
Thus, the opportunity for vote trading based on a lack of impact is narrower
than it is in the legislature because of the broad set of interests each judge
represents. Cases also come to the Supreme Court with closed records, which
complicates the ability to accommodate a particular party's position. The
adversarial nature of the proceeding and doctrines like standing also limit, with
judicial cognizance, the scope of information that the judiciary can consider.
Thus, judges are somewhat hesitant when considering how the decision they
reach will impact others not before the court. In addition, the culture of
judicial impartiality provides an important check on democratic forces and
hinders vote trading there.
Within the executive branch, the governor is largely immune from
logrolling concerns. He or she simply has no one to trade with. As for
administrative agencies under his or her auspices, the political accountability
of the gubernatorial vote (through the appointment and removal powers)
carries with it no logrolling concern because of the statewide electoral
structure. Again, there are no votes to trade, even if there are political games
to play. Other executive branch bodies, while they may be politically
accountable and elected from districts, generally operate within narrow subject
areas and have electoral districts at broader scales, which drastically limits the
ability of actors within those areas to trade votes.
Matters are, of course, more complicated than this rough sketch. But an
important point emerges: the question of what sorts of general legislation are
problematic under the special-legislation doctrine is, potentially, a question
informed by the suitability of other branches of government to make decisions
that govern the electorate. To the extent the doctrine places matters off limits
for the legislature, it does not limit the authority of any other branch of
government to provide the same relief. Thus, while a broad special-legislation
doctrine invites laws that become arbitrary in their application because the
legislature cannot take account of relevant differences that exist at small scales,
another branch may be able to deal with the problem.
The judiciary, for example, may be able to make exceptions and perform
167. This is not to say, of course, that judicial lawmaking does not occur at broad levels. The
modem class action is one example of judicially attending to matters involving multiple members of the
electorate. And, given the role of precedent, individualized lawmaking always has a governing impact.
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interpretational moves that will ensure the legislative goals are achieved in
application.168 And, given the role of precedent, this is no less lawmaking than
if the legislature had done it. Rather, the main difference is the institutional
actor involved in the decision, and the characteristics of that institutional actor
inform whether or not the judiciary should do it instead of the legislature. If,
on the other hand, the special legislation doctrine restricts nothing more than
general legislation involving very small classes, then the legislature's ability to
fashion law that suits the complex society in which it will be deployed is
preserved and the judicial role diminished. Thus, if we put the need for
individualized or small-class treatment in focus, the question of how broadly
or narrowly to interpret special-legislation restrictions involves inversely
proportional scopes of judicial and legislative power. As legislative power
decreases, the judiciary may take up the slack, and vice versa.
As for the executive, the parameters of the delegation doctrine could also
influence the question of how much to restrict the legislature. Courts,
interestingly enough, are the arbiters of this relationship, but they would do
well to recognize this link, allowing a broader sphere of delegation where a
broad special-legislation doctrine places a great deal off of the legislative
agenda. With a narrower limitation, the delegation doctrine can be limited
without sacrificing the ability of government to deal with problems at small
scales.169
C Enumerated Cases, General-Iaw Preferences, and AssociatedDoctnnal
Impacts
The discussion in Part III created a two-step understanding of special-
legislation provisions and their doctrines, concluding that these restrictions
affect special laws and functionally special laws. That analysis overlooks what
the restriction on such laws entails-what the rest of the text means, how it
should be applied, and what impact it may have on the doctrine.
Recall that some special-legislation restrictions only prohibit special
legislation on enumerated subjects. In all other matters, those provisions
require that special laws be avoided when general laws can be used. 170 The
case law often overlooks this distinction. In many special-legislation cases,
special-legislation provisions are cited as prohibiting special legislation, the
tests are quoted from an earlier case as the tests for detecting special laws, and
then they are applied. Laws that pass muster are constitutional, while those
that do not, are not.17
168. There is sometimes constitutional protection afforded this role. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. V,
§ 9 (protecting district courts' equity jurisdiction); K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Scottsbluff, 447 N.W.2d
227 (Neb. 1989) (stating that "[t]he equity jurisdiction of a district court is granted by the Constitution
and legislature could not be legislatively limited or controlled").
169. There are, however, other reasons not to limit the delegation doctrine. Some matters, for
instance, require the expertise of administrative agencies.
170. See supra, text accompanying note 37.
171. See, e.g., Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1990) (striking down
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The outcome-determinative reasoning of these cases is textually
problematic. The text says that special laws are acceptable, so long as they do
not relate to an enumerated subject and a general law cannot be made
applicable. If special laws are acceptable in some cases, but not others (as the
provision says), then deploying doctrines that doom all functionally special
laws is not textually sound.
These cases could be explained as strong approaches to evasion. That is,
if the point of the special-legislation doctrine is to detect instances of evasion,
one could argue that failing the doctrinal tests means that the legislature has
broken the rules and, thus, its legislation should be struck down without further
inquiry. However, evasion is premised upon the existence of a functionally
special law, and the text allows special laws. The doctrine is the only thing that
extends the constitutional rules on special laws into the realm of general laws.
If the doctrine strikes down general laws simply because they are functionally
special, it is exceeding the scope of the constitutional harm embodied in the
text.172 Thus, courts should take into account the rest of the text of these
provisions. 7 3
Within the enumerated subjects, the rest of the text is simple: no special
law can be enacted. Thus, for example, if the hypothetical pipeline law fell
within an enumerated subject, then it would simply be struck down if it were
special (i.e., it identified TransCanada) or functionally special (i.e., it created a
closed class or involved an arbitrary class).'74
Beyond enumerated cases lies the general-preference clause-
constitutional text mandating the use of a general law when one can be made
applicable.' 75 Thus, if a law is special or functionally special and does not deal
with an enumerated subject, then it poses no constitutional problem unless a
general law can be made applicable. Consequently, for example, the pipeline
law might be allowed even if it is special or functionally special.
Most cases that address this language make a judgment using a justificatory
standard geared at uniqueness. Justice Cardozo famously provided an
example of such a test under the Maryland provision in a case reviewing a
special law:
a deannexation statute identifying a closed class); State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273
(Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (striking down a statute as special legislation where it irrationally classified the
State Compensation Fund and required it to pay a minimum tax).
172. See Clark, supra note 16, at 643 (criticizing the Kansas Supreme Court for not making this
second inquiry).
173. A few courts have recognized this. See, e.g., South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003).
Other provisions of state constitutions may also allow special or local laws. See, e.g., Maple Run at
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. 1996) (allowing a generally framed law
that was deemed local because another provision of the Texas Constitution allowed local laws).
174. But see, Banks v. Heineman, 837 N.W.2d 70 (Neb. 2013) (concluding that a statute involving a
closed class was constitutional even though it granted a corporation a special privilege because the
legislature had a "reasonable basis" for doing so). Notably, Banks can be read as involving no special
privilege and, thus, falling squarely within the general-preference provision.
175. In some states, the general-preference clause is all there is. The analysis provided here pertains
to those states as well as states that have an enumerated list of subjects.
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The Constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always.
It permits them when there are special evils with which existing
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
then sustain the special form. The problem in last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in cases of plain abuse will there be revision by the
courts. If the evil to be corrected can be seen to be merely fanciful,
the injustice or the wrong illusory, the courts may intervene and
strike the special statute down. If special circumstances have
developed, and circumstances of such a nature as to call for a new
rule, the special act will stand. 176
Justice Cardozo's standard involves a "wide margin of discretion conceded to
the lawmakers." 77  There is a strong argument that such discretion is
inappropriate. The entire premise of restricting special legislation is that
legislatures are not structurally fit to write special legislation. There is little
reason to think they are structurally fit to determine whether or not special
legislation is more appropriate than general legislation. The very problems
that attend special legislation will attend the choice to use a special law in lieu
of a general one.178 Moreover, with a democratically accountable judiciary and
a doctrine that triggers judicial review only of laws that amount to
individualized treatment, the judiciary is suited to the task of reconsidering the
merits of the legislative judgment. Thus, one could ratchet up the standard of
review without offending the underlying rationale of these provisions. Given
the structural rationale of these provisions, it may even be suitable to place the
burden on those that defend such a law to justify its terms.
However, the point for present purposes is not to consider how that
standard might be ratcheted up, but rather to consider how it affects the larger
doctrinal landscape. General-preference tests, like Justice Cardozo's, do not
affect the larger doctrinal landscape when applied to special legislation or
functionally special, closed-class legislation. For example, the law naming
TransCanada should be justified only upon a finding that there are very good,
factually supported reasons to expose that pipeline company to exclusive
regulation. Similarly, the closed-class pipeline law would be allowed if there
are very good, factually supported reasons to expose pipelines with
176. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933). See also City of Malibu v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating similar standard). But see Clark,
supra note 16, at 636-37 (describing the Kansas Supreme Court's inconsistent use and standardless
approach to the question of uniqueness, involving an expansive use of judicial notice and inquiries into
legislative history).
177. Willams, 289 U.S. at 46.
178. See supra Part IV.A (considering a process-based justification for a relatively demanding class-
legislation test geared at evasion); Cf Schrader v. Floida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 840 So. 2d 1050
(Fla. 2003) (concluding the Florida Keys were so unique and of such statewide importance that naming
them and allowing local governments within that area unique powers did not constitute a special or
local law).
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applications pending on a certain date to special treatment.179
However, when a law is functionally special because it fails the class-
legislation test, matters are more complex. In many ways, the general-
preference test looks like the class-legislation test that my framework uses to
guard against evasion. Both are geared at the purposes underlying the
legislation and the scope of the class relevant to those purposes. Assuming the
parameters of these tests are the same 80 (though the standard may be higher
under the general-preference clause 81 ) there is no need to test functionally
special laws involving arbitrary classifications for justification under the
general-preference clause. Such functionally special laws have already been
exposed to a relatively weak class-legislation test and they have failed. In all
179. Although a fine and subtle point, the inquiry should not ask whether the pipeline company
deserves special legislation. If the legislature wants to trigger such an inquiry, it should name the object.
The court's inquiry should focus on the characteristics the legislature offers to define the class.
180. There is a line of Indiana cases that effectively concludes they are not. While defensible, they
are ultimately unpersuasive. In State v. Hoovier, 668 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 1996), the court was faced with
a law using population criteria that isolated Tippecanoe County and gave it taxing authority to clean
up a Superfund site. Id. at 1231-32. The class was open, but the court concluded the legislation was
"special" because population had nothing to do with the need for taxing authority. Id. at 1234. That is,
the classification served no purpose other than to identify Tippecanoe County. Nonetheless, the court
found that the special law was justified by unique conditions in that county, including a superfund
liability. Id. at 1234-35. The court in Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind.
2003), explained this case as resting on a distinction between "defining characteristics" and "justifying
characteristics", concluding that even though the defining characteristics were arbitrary, there were
justifying characteristics of the class member that made the special law constitutional. Id at 691.
While the court's reasoning is defensible, it is unpersuasive. The doctrine should require the
legislature to speak with the characteristics it finds relevant. That is, after all, one of the primary reasons
for restricting it from naming names. Thus, it should have reasoned that the law was functionally special
because arbitrary criteria were used to create a class of one. Effectively, that would end matters because
the ensuing justification test would examine the same criteria under a standard that was at least as
demanding.
The legislature could, of course, name the object. If it were to do so, the court would simply
proceed to the justificatory test, unpaking the reasons why the legislature narrowed the class to the
named object and judging whether those reasons are sufficient. To the Kimseycourt, this meant that
the law using arbitrary criteria to identify Tippecanoe County should be tested the same as a special
law naming it. I agree, but the trick Hoovlerused (and Kinseyexplained) to generate a different result
is ill conceived. It changed the parameters of the ensuing justificatory test to, incoherently, justify the
arbitrariness found in the legislation's text. To do so, it looked to the class member to see if special
treatment was justified. The inquiry should, however, remain with the class as defined.
When the inquiry remains on the classification criteria, it encourages legislative transparency
and simplifies the judicial task. Whether the member of the class deserves special treatment is, of
course, the right question when a special law or a functional special law is involved. But the court
should examine the characteristics the legislature used to identify the class. Extending the inquiry to
the class member encourages legislation that is evasive and unnecessarily complicates the judicial task
by making it differentiate between defining characteristics (used to determine whether or not the law
is functionally special) and justificatory characteristics (used to determine whether the functionally
special law is justified).
Moreover, when the class is open to future entry (as was the class in Hoover) future members
will be able to get the special treatment accorded the present class member. They will, of course, have
the defining characteristics, but they may have none of the justifying characteristics. The defining
characteristics should be the only focus of the inquiry.
181. For instance, such a test could require that purposes be important and that taking account of
the factual distinctions be necessary to achieve such a purpose. See supra Part IV.A (explaining how
class-legislation inquiries should not become justificatory, but should rather remain geared at evasion).
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cases, such a law would fail a general-preference test that is as stringent or more
stringent.
The matter is somewhat tricky because passing the class-legislation test
means the legislation is general and, thus, not subject to further review under
the general-preference clause. For example, consider the open-class pipeline
legislation, limiting its coverage to pipelines of a certain size. If that legislation
passes the class-legislation inquiry, then it would be general and, thus, not
subject to further inquiry. However, if that legislation fails the class-legislation
inquiry, then it would be functionally special. Such a law should be exposed to
another test to justify its use. However, because that law failed the low
standard for detecting evasion, it would a fortiori fail another test that is at
least as demanding. Thus, no further inquiry is needed. 182
In effect, the class-legislation evasion test masks the presence of a general-
preference justificatory test in cases involving functionally special laws with
arbitrary classifications. This observation explains some cases that employ the
class-legislation test in an outcome-determinative way to legislation that does
not relate to an enumerated subject. Such cases are making an evasion inquiry,
hopefully triggered by a very small class size. Laws that fail such tests are
functionally special and should be available if they can be justified under the
general-preference test. However, because the general-preference test
involves the same sort of inquiry, perhaps in a more demanding form, there is
no need to test the law again. In all cases, it would fail.
This is a sensible way of understanding the special-legislation doctrine in
light of the general-preference language. There are, however, courts that
interpret the general-preference language in a way that has a more far-reaching
doctrinal impact. Some courts interpret that language as leaving the question
almost entirely to the legislature. This ill-advised approach displaces all
special-legislation doctrine outside of enumerated cases and overlooks the
structural rational for these provisions.
If the general-preference clause is interpreted to mean that the use of a
special law is at the discretion of the legislature, then the court will make an
evasion inquiry only in cases that involve enumerated subjects. This is because
the status of a law as special, functionally special, or general largely does not
matter in cases involving the general-preference clause. Even if the legislation
constitutes functionally special legislation, there is no reason to apply the
evasion tests because it is the legislature's prerogative to use a special or a
general law. Thus, in some states, closed-class tests and class-legislation tests
182. This overlap may appear odd. There is one way of framing the doctrine to avoid it. A court
could remove the class-legislation test from the evasion inquiry in cases that do not involve enumerated
subjects. One cannot, however, move the class-legislation test from the evasion inquiry to the general-
preference clause in all instances. Within the enumerated subjects, the class-legislation test must remain
in the evasion inquiry. Otherwise, the doctrine would only prohibit general legislation that involves a
closed class of one. Arbitrary classes of one would raise no problem even though such laws are
functionally special.
183. In states with no list of enumerated cases, this approach displaces all of the special-legislation
doctrine developed above.
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are used only in cases involving enumerated subjects.
Colorado does this. It requires legislation on enumerated subjects to have
an open, reasonable classification. Such legislation must involve a "real or
potential class" rather than a class that is "logically and factually limited to a
class of one and thus illusory." 1a But, under the general-preference clause,
"the question of whether a general law could be made applicable is within the
discretion of the General Assembly, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion. Also, "the size of the class becomes irrelevant. "186The
court is clearly failing to make an inquiry into whether a law is functionally
special in cases that don't involve enumerated subjects. The reason is that it
doesn't need to make such an inquiry. Because the general-preference
question is for the legislature, there is no reason to apply the evasion tests.
Indeed, a special law would get the same lack of judicial scrutiny.
Consequently, in Colorado, the hypothetical pipeline legislation would
receive nearly no judicial review if the law did not involve an enumerated
subject. And this would be the case if the law named TransCanada or used
criteria to isolate it. However, if the legislation involved an enumerated
subject, the inquiry would be different. Legislation that names TransCanada
would be struck down. If the legislation uses criteria instead of a name, the
court would use its evasion inquiries. If the law were deemed functionally
special (or, as Colorado puts it, involves an "illusory class of one""), then it
would also be struck down.
Structurally speaking, the Colorado court's approach cannot be defended.
There is no reason to leave to the legislature the question of whether a general
law can be made applicable. Again, the entire premise of restricting special
legislation is that legislatures are not structurally fit to write special legislation.
There is little reason to think they are structurally fit to determine whether or
not special legislation is more appropriate than general legislation. The very
problems that attend special legislation will attend the choice to use a special
law in lieu of a general one. In fact, some constitutions have been amended
in response to judicial doctrines like this, which place legislative foxes in charge
of the special-legislation henhouse. 189
184. In re Interrogatory, 814 P.2d 875, 886 (Colo. 1991) (en banc). The Hawai'i courts have
followed the Colorado approach, at least in enumerated cases. See Sierra Club v. Dept. of Transp. of
State of Hawai'i, 202 P.3d 1226 (Haw. 2009).
185. In re Interrogatory, 814 P.2d at 885.
186. Id. at 886.
187. Id. at 887.
188. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 461 ("If the prohibition against special laws exists, however, to
prevent corrupt legislatures from adopting corrupt legislation, then it would be silly to leave its
enforcement to the legislature").
189. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IV, sec 13; MINN. CONST. art XII, § 1; see also NAT'L MUN. LEAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 55-56 (6th ed. 1968).
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In sum, if a law is special or functionally special, then it should be struck
down in enumerated cases without further inquiry. Beyond enumerated cases,
special or functionally special laws can be employed, so long as a general law
cannot be made applicable. The court should make this decision, and the test
for justifying the use of special or functionally special laws should focus on why
such legislation is necessary under the circumstances facing the legislature.
Some functionally special laws (those failing class-legislation tests) will a
fortiorifail a general-preference justification test.
CONCLUSION
State constitutional law poses significant restraints on the ability of state
legislatures to write some legislation. The special-legislation provision is one
example. At its core, it restricts the legislature's ability to identify objects in
legislation. While this may appear to be a minor matter of draftsman's form,
it has a significant and underappreciated structural rationale that operates to
place the legislature in a policymaking role and keeps it from becoming mired
in attending to individual problems.
When fully appreciated, the judiciary's role and the tests courts employ
come into sharper focus. The doctrine is, or should be, geared at reigning in
evasive legislatures and detecting instances of functionally special laws. It does
so by examining general legislation that applies to very small classes. If such a
class is closed or bounded by arbitrary criteria that exclude similarly situated
objects, then the legislation should be treated as functionally special. Such
legislation should be struck down in enumerated cases or subjected to the same
justificatory general-preference test that would apply had the legislature
enacted a special law.
All of this is consistent with the text, the history, and the underlying
structural rationale of these provisions. However, utilizing these provisions as
individual-rights provisions does damage to the constitution drafters' design.
Thus, judicial review should not extend to legislation involving classes that do
not raise the problem of individualized treatment. Such reviews should be
premised upon some other constitutional text that licenses courts to make such
inquiries.
This study also reveals potential pitfalls that attend the structural
understanding. For example, alternative process-based accounts of special-
legislation doctrine may emerge, but they should not be taken to expand the
scope of the doctrine to larger classes. And while there are concerns for inter-
branch suitability that underlie these provisions, they should not operate to
expand the scope of special-legislation doctrine.
There are, however, opportunities for doctrinal innovation. One identified
here is taking a more fine-grained approach to identifying those pieces of
legislation that raise the risk of insufficient legislative scrutiny and, thus,
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deserve judicial review. Others surely will emerge with further study.
In short, special-legislation provisions reveal a host of interesting and
important insights that this article has only begun to develop. The
understanding developed here, of course, does not remove all uncertainty
associated with special-legislation provisions. Nor does it remove all tools by
which the judiciary may overreach. Class-legislation tests, for example, involve
multiple inquiries that are difficult for the judiciary to perform and perform on
a consistent basis. But my hope is that it provides guidance in an important
area of constitutional law that often escapes rigorous consideration.
